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This article covers cases from Volumes 464 through 498 of the South
Western Reporter (Third Edition) and federal cases during the same
period that the authors believe are noteworthy to the jurisprudence on
the applicable subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey period continues with the onslaught of cases arising from
the home mortgage meltdown that began in 2008. Numerous cases of first
impression on various aspects of foreclosures (a mortgage servicer is a
debt collector under the Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
collateral attacks on a tax lien sale) and home-equity liens are addressed.
Tax lien cases also remain prevalent, presenting a few unique aspects.
Two cases addressed the recission of acceleration notices. Most impor-
tantly, the Texas Supreme Court addressed issues of first impression on
constitutional forfeitures and limitation periods in the home-equity lien
context.
As in past years, the courts addressed the ambiguity of contracts, the
Statute of Frauds, and the parol evidence rule in multiple cases. Histori-
cally, courts and practititioners have rarely dealt with the Statute of
Frauds, but today the issue seems to arise with increasing frequency. In
one notable case, the court dealt with the often relied-upon clause in
transaction documents requiring all amendments to be in writing.
In connection with title matters, the courts continued trying to discern
the intent of the parties or the desired outcome. There are a number of
cases illustrating drafting considerations and procedures for perfecting ti-
tle. Easement cases claiming a roadway were also further refined. Finally
the Texas Supreme Court addressed various statutes providing limitations
on premises liability.
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II. MORTGAGES, LIENS, AND FORECLOSURES
A. ATTORNEY IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Sheena1 dealt with whether an attorney’s
actions in representing a mortgagor, Optimum Arbor Oaks, are subject to
the doctrine of attorney immunity. Attorney Sheena obtained insurance
proceeds from the insurance company after the mortgagee, U.S. Bank,
had provided a notice of default to the owner, a copy of which Sheena
received. After receiving the default notice letter and the insurance pro-
ceeds, Sheena received a notice of intent to foreclose. Sheena deposited
the insurance payment into his trust fund and made disbursements pursu-
ant to his client’s (the mortgagor’s) instructions.2 After a foreclosure, the
bank sued the mortgagee and Sheena based on misappropriation of insur-
ance proceeds, tortious interference with contract, conversion, conspir-
acy, fraudulent transfer, and negligence.3
Sheena asserted the attorney-immunity doctrine, which protects an at-
torney from liability to a third party for damages caused by the attorney’s
actions in the course of representation. An exception to the attorney-im-
munity doctrine arises when fraudulent actions are taken by an attorney,
which U.S. Bank asserted was applicable to Sheena’s actions. The trial
court upheld Sheena’s motion for summary judgment, and the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals analyzed the propriety of such action, begin-
ning with the 1882 Texas Supreme Court case, Poole v. Houston & T.C.
Railway Co.4 In Poole, the supreme court recited that wrongful acts of an
attorney that are “entirely foreign to the duties of an attorney” would not
be proper for the attorney-immunity doctrine defense.5
After discussing numerous appellate court rulings attempting to clarify
the attorney-immunity doctrine, the court of appeals discussed the more
recent Texas Supreme Court case, Cantey Hanger, LLP v. Byrd.6 In Can-
tey Hanger, the supreme court held that an attorney relying on the attor-
ney-immunity doctrine must prove that the attorney’s alleged wrongful
misconduct, even if fraudulent, was part of the discharge of the attorney’s
duty to the client.7 In summarizing the Cantey Hanger opinion, the court
of appeals concluded that the Cantey Hanger analysis could relate to ei-
ther the “complete immunity rule” or the “partial immunity rule,” and
proceeded to discuss both.8 Under the partial immunity rule, the attorney
must prove both (1) that the alleged conduct, even if fraudulent, was part
of the discharge of the attorney’s duties to the client in the litigation con-
text; and (2) that the conduct was not “foreign to the duties of an attor-
1. 479 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
2. Id. at 476.
3. Id.
4. 58 Tex. 134 (1882).
5. Id. at 137.
6. 467 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. 2015).
7. Id. at 484.
8. Sheena, 479 S.W.3d at 479 (citing Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 483–85).
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ney.”9 The complete immunity rule requires only the existence of the first
criteria under the partial immunity rule; in other words, the attorney does
not have to prove that the alleged conduct was not “foreign to the duties
of an attorney.”10
The court of appeals concluded that Sheena conclusively proved that
his actions were part of his “duties to his client in the litigation context”
and were not “foreign to the duties of an attorney.”11 Interestingly, the
court of appeals based its reasoning on the basis of Sheena’s actions in a
litigation context, as it was in the Cantey Hanger opinion; however, the
actions taken by Sheena in this case were actually taken prior to litigation
when the mortgagee had only provided a notice of intent to foreclose, but
had not yet foreclosed and not yet filed suit. Consequently, a question is
raised as to whether Sheena or Cantey Hanger would be applicable to an
attorney who obtains insurance proceeds and disburses such proceeds in
contravention of a mortgage when litigation has not yet commenced and
notice of intent to foreclose has not been given. Practitioners may not feel
comfortable undertaking such action until further clarification is obtained
from the courts.
B. TAX LIEN TRANSFERS
Issues dealing with the transfer of statutory tax liens continue during
this Survey period, as they have over numerous prior survey periods. In
Billings v. Propel Financial Services, LLC,12 the property owners became
delinquent in property taxes and arranged for a property tax lender to
pay such taxes and obtain the transfer of the governmental tax lien pursu-
ant to the Texas statutory provisions therefor.13 Here, after the owner’s
tax lien was paid, the owner sued the tax lien lender, alleging violations of
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).14
9. Id. (quoting Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 485). Examples of attorney actions that
are foreign to the attorney’s duties are: “(1) participation in a fraudulent business scheme
with a client outside the litigation context, (2) . . . drafting and filing fraudulent legal docu-
ments in a non-litigation context[ ] for the purpose of conspiring to hide the client’s assets
from judgment creditors in violation of [a statutory prohibition,] and (3) a physical assault
committed by the attorney during trial.” Id. at 480 (citing Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at
482; Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2012, pet. denied)).
10. Id. at 480–81.
11. Id. at 481 (citing Cantey Hanger, 467 S.W.3d at 482–86).
12. 821 F.3d 608 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 372 (2016).
13. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 32.06, 32.065 (West 2015). The required statutory
procedure is for the owner to authorize a third party lender to pay the delinquent property
taxes by means of a written authorization in favor of the tax lien lender, the payment by
the tax lien lender of the delinquent property taxes, the issuance by the taxing authority of
a tax receipt to the tax lien lender reflecting the payment, and the issuance of a transfer of
the tax lien from the governmental entity to the tax lien lender. See id. Further, the typical
procedure requires the owner to enter into a new contract or note with the tax lien lender
evidencing the amount paid as well as other costs and fees payable in connection with such
transaction. See id.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16.02–.93r (2012).
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The TILA applies to consumer credit transactions, and the issue
presented was whether the TILA applied to a tax lien payment and trans-
fer to a third-party lender/transferee. The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau interprets the TILA and has issued various regulations (known as
“Regulation Z”), which provide that tax liens and assessments are ex-
cluded from the definition of “credit” unless the credit is a direct “third-
party financing of such obligations,” such as an owner acquiring a bank
loan to pay his own tax liens.15 This interpretation was confirmed by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Tax Ease Funding, L.P. v.
Thompson (In re Kizzee-Jordan), which held that tax lien transfers are
not extensions of credit pursuant to the provisions of the TILA.16
However, Billings’s position was that the execution of a new note se-
cured by the transfer of the tax lien represented a new extension of credit
as opposed to a transfer of an existing tax obligation.17 The Fifth Circuit
held that the tax lien transfer was not a new extension of credit and re-
cited its prior conclusions in In re Kizzee-Jordan: (1) the tax claim was
transferred with the tax lien and not extinguished and replaced by a new
debt; (2) the transfer of the tax lien preserved the existing tax lien claim
(changing only the entity holding the claim without changing “the nature
of the underlying debt”); and (3) the execution of the transfer and new
promissory note did not satisfy the original obligation and did not create
a new credit subject to the TILA.18
C. FORECLOSURE – QUASI-ESTOPPEL
In Freezia v. IS Storage Venture, LLC, a foreclosure sale was upheld
based upon the doctrine of quasi-estoppel against the property owner.19
The property was originally owned by Designer Homes, Inc., which sub-
sequently forfeited its charter for failure to pay franchise taxes, whereby
ownership of the property reverted to its sole shareholder, the father of
Freezia.20 The father eventually died testate, and the property passed to
Freezia and her three sisters. In connection with a subsequent financing
transaction, however, Freezia learned that the property was still titled in
the name of Designer Homes. Freezia therefore formed a new company
called Original Designer Homes, Inc. (ODH), reciting in the incorpora-
tion documents that ODH succeeded to the interest of and was essen-
tially the same as Designer Homes, but with a new name; however, there
was no assignment of Designer Homes’ property interest to ODH.
15. Billings, 821 F.3d at 610 (citing 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026, Supp. I, Subpart A, cmt.
2(a)(14)(I)(ii)).
16. Tax Ease Funding, L.P. v. Thompson (In re Kizzee-Jordan), 626 F.3d 239, 244 (5th
Cir. 2010).
17. Billings, 821 F.3d at 612.
18. Id. at 612–13 (citing In re Kizzee-Jordan, 626 F.3d at 240–46; Pollice v. Nat’l Tax
Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 409–11 (3d Cir. 2000)).
19. Freezia v. IS Storage Venture, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 379, 388–89 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
20. Id. at 382.
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Freezia and ODH defaulted under the loan transaction, and the lender,
JLE Investors, Inc. (JLE), foreclosed and acquired title at the foreclosure
sale. JLE sold the property to IS Storage, with financing by Post Oak
Bank. After the foreclosure, Freezia learned that ODH did not own the
property since it had passed to Freezia’s father through the charter forfei-
ture and then to her and her three sisters through the probate of her
father’s will.21 Thus, Freezia sued her lender, her lender’s deed of trust
trustee, the purchaser, and the purchaser’s lender for various causes of
action.
Upon appeal from various summary judgments, the Fourteenth Hous-
ton Court of Appeals determined that Freezia presented sufficient evi-
dence as to her claim of ownership to avoid the summary judgments
rendered against her.22 The interesting aspect of this case, however, was
the affirmative defense raised by Freezia’s lender, JLE, based upon quasi-
estoppel, which the court explained as “[precluding] a party from assert-
ing, to another’s disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previ-
ously taken.”23 Freezia had executed a deed of trust, promissory note and
other documents on behalf of ODH and a guaranty in her individual ca-
pacity. The various loan documents contained representations that ODH
owned the property and had good title to the property. Consequently, the
court of appeals held that Freezia was estopped by the equitable doctrine
of estoppel by contract (one form of quasi-estoppel) such that she could
not take the different position in the lawsuit that the property was not
owned by ODH because it would result in Freezia receiving both the
$360,000 loan and title to the property, thus unjustly enriching Freezia.24
The instructive aspects of this case may be things not discussed in the
opinion and that may not have been done in connection with the actual
transactions. First, JLE conducted the title search revealing that the prop-
erty was owned by Designer Homes, which the court of appeals deter-
mined, as a matter of law and fact, to be incorrect.25 There is no
explanation as to why the provider of the title work was not included in
the suit; presumably, there would have been a title policy insuring title in
the wrong entity. Second, if Freezia had not obtained title by transfers
from her sisters, would the result have been different? In other words,
although Freezia was estopped from making the claim of title inconsistent
with the representations in the loan documents, the result might have
been different if the three other sisters had filed suit (without having
made a transfer to Freezia) claiming title to the property. Since the three
sisters would not have made any inconsistent representations in the loan
documents—as they were not parties—would the three sisters have pre-
vailed on this point? This could be a planning tool for practitioners faced
with a similar situation.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 389.
23. Id. at 387.
24. Id. at 387–89.
25. See id. at 386.
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D. FORECLOSURES – DEBT COLLECTOR
In Lamell v. OneWest Bank, FSB,26 a case of first impression for Texas,
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals considered whether a mort-
gage servicer constituted a debt collector within the meaning of the Texas
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (TFDCPA).27 Homeowner Lamell en-
tered into a mortgage transaction with Home123 Corporation as the
mortgagee. Servicing of the mortgage was transferred to OneWest Bank,
and the deed of trust was assigned to a securitization trust. Lamell de-
faulted, was foreclosed upon, and brought suit, alleging numerous errors
with the assignment and securitization process. Among other allegations,
Lamell asserted that OneWest was a debt collector under the TFDCPA28
and had not complied with its applicable provisions. There are no statu-
tory exceptions to the definition of debt collector under Texas law.29 The
court of appeals concluded that OneWest was a debt collector under the
plain language of the TFDCPA.30 As noted above, this was a case of first
impression for the determination that a mortgage servicer is a debt collec-
tor under the TFDCPA; however, the court of appeals distinguished the
TFDCPA from the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.31 The fed-
eral definition of debt collector32 contains an exclusion covering “any
person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due . . . an-
other to the extent such activity . . . concerns a debt which was not in
default at the time it was obtained by such person,”33 which would apply
to a mortgage servicer such as OneWest. Since OneWest began servicing
the debt prior to any default, this exclusion applied and the Federal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act was not applicable.34
E. FORECLOSURES – BONA FIDE ERROR DEFENSE
Alanis v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n35 involves a suit against a foreclos-
ing lender, the mortgage servicer, the law firm hired to handle the fore-
closure, and the purchaser and its lender at the foreclosure sale. The First
Houston Court of Appeals found that Alanis failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain her many alleged claims of wrongdoing in connection
with the foreclosure, except for Alanis’s claim that the law firm failed to
26. 485 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
27. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.001 (West 2016).
28. Id. § 392.001(6) (defining a “debt collector” as “a person who directly or indirectly
engages in debt collection . . . to collect consumer debts”).
29. Lamell, 485 S.W.3d at 63 (citing FIN. § 392.001(6)).
30. Id.
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (2012).
32. Section 1692a(6) defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of
which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attemps to collect, directly
or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”
33. Id. § 1692a(6)(F).
34. Lamell, 485 S.W.3d at 63.
35. 489 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2015, pet. denied).
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comply with the TFDCPA.36 The law firm asserted the bona fide error
defense in connection with its allegedly incorrect claims for various fees
and other charges in its demand notices. Debt collectors, as stated in the
TFDCPA, “may not use a fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading represen-
tation,” which Alanis alleged had occurred because of the “incorrect”
charges.37 However, the bona fide error defense was available for debt
collectors that proved, first, “that the violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error” and, second, “that the creditor adopted
procedures . . . designed to avoid and prevent [such] errors.”38 As to the
second element, the court found that a “debt collector must show that it
used reasonable procedures to prevent the error.”39
As to the first element, the law firm had sufficiently proven that the
mortgage servicer provided all information and documentation that the
law firm used in connection with the foreclosure and that all amounts
recited by the law firm were identical to the default amount and other
fees and costs provided by the mortgage servicer.40 As to the second ele-
ment, the law firm partner’s testimony regarding the measures taken to
avoid errors in the receipt and use of information provided by the mort-
gage servicer—which included double checking all information received,
verifying information used for the foreclosure, confirming that documents
received from the mortgage servicer were proper and consistent, and ex-
clusively relying on information believed to be correct—was sufficient for
the bona fide error exception to apply.41 Practitioners collecting con-
sumer debt should take heed and establish appropriate procedures for
verification against errors like those listed above.
F. FORECLOSURE – CHANGE-OF-ADDRESS NOTICE BY TEXT MESSAGE
In Bauder v. Alegria, a foreclosure sale was held invalid because the
notices of default and foreclosure sale were sent to an incorrect address.42
Alegria bought a house on Neuman Street, but the deed of trust financing
such acquisition provided that her mailing address was on Roosevelt
Street, not the secured property address. Through a series of text message
exchanges between Alegria and Bauder, Bauder was informed that Ale-
gria no longer lived at the Roosevelt Street address, having sold that
home and moved to the Neuman Street address. Although Alegria never
sent a change-of-address notice, Bauder texted Alegria that he was aware
of her sale of the Roosevelt Street property and move to the Neuman
36. Id. at 511.
37. Id. at 503–04 (quoting TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.304(a) (West 2016)); see also
FIN. §§ 392.304–.404.
38. Alanis, 489 S.W.3d at 504 (quoting Torres v. Mid-State Trust II, 895 S.W.2d 828,
831 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied)).
39. Id. (citing CA Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51, 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, pet. denied)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bauder v. Alegria, 480 S.W.3d 92, 93, 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.).
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Street property, and he asserted that he would assume this was her new
mailing address unless Alegria advised Bauder to the contrary, which she
did not.43 Bauder’s attorney sent a notice of default and a notice to cure,
as well as a notice of foreclosure sale, to Alegria at her Roosevelt ad-
dress. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals concluded that Bauder
knew of the address change and should have used the Neuman Street
address since Bauder was the mortgage servicer.44 Despite allegations by
Bauder to the contrary, the court of appeals further concluded that Ale-
gria was not required to provide a change-of-address notice since the
Neuman house was not her residence at the time of the deed of trust’s
execution as required under the Texas Property Code.45 The exchange of
text messages between Bauder and Alegria constituted notice in Bauder’s
records (as the mortgage servicer) as the latest mailing address for
Alegria.46
G. TAX LIEN SALE – COLLATERAL ATTACK
In a case of first impression, American Homeowner Preservation Fund,
LP v. Pirkle, the assignee of a deed-of-trust lienholder was held to have
no standing to collaterally attack a tax lien sale.47 Pirkle purchased prop-
erty at a tax lien sale. Notice of the tax lien sale had been given and
service had been accomplished on various parties excluding the then-ex-
isting deed-of-trust lienholder. American Homeowner Preservation Fund
(Fund) was the purchaser of the existing deed of trust from the original
lienholder, Stewardship Fund No. 3, LP (SF3). The tax lien suit was filed
on August 27, 2010, and the judgment was entered on April 26, 2012. The
tax lien foreclosure sale occurred on August 7, 2012, and the tax lien deed
was recorded on August 27, 2012. Approximately two months later, SF3
assigned all of its rights in the deed of trust to the Fund. Although the
Fund knew of the intervening tax lien sale, it did not follow the proce-
dures for challenging the tax lien sale under the Texas Tax Code,48 but
chose to collaterally attack the tax lien judgment after the applicable limi-
tation period. The Fund provided a notice of its foreclosure sale under
the deed of trust, and the issue was joined when Pirkle filed a temporary
restraining order against the foreclosure sale. The trial court held that the
tax lien sale extinguished the Fund’s rights under the assigned deed of
trust.49
43. Id. at 94.
44. The actual mortgagee was Gerald Bauder, but Gerald Bauder had executed a
power of attorney in favor of his son, Robert Bauder, in order to collect mortgage pay-
ments. Id. at 94, 97–98. The court determined, in a footnote without any real discussion,
that this was sufficient evidence to show that Robert was a mortgage servicer under the
applicable provisions of the Texas Property Code. Id. at 95, n.6.
45. Id. at 97; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.0001(2)(A) (West 2014).
46. Bauder, 480 S.W.3d at 97–98.
47. Am. Homeowner Pres. Fund, LP v. Pirkle, 475 S.W.3d 507, 508, 526 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied).
48. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.08 (West 2015).
49. Pirkle, 475 S.W.3d at 511.
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On appeal, the Fund argued that “SF3 was a necessary and indispensa-
ble party to the delinquent tax suit” and failure to join it would not bind
the Fund to the tax sale judgment.50 On the other hand, Pirkle contended
that the tax sale operated to vest full, absolute title in Pirkle, as the tax
lien purchaser, free of all subordinate claims. The applicable Texas Tax
Code provision with respect to challenges to the validity of a tax lien sale
stated:
A person may not commence an action challenging the validity of a
tax sale . . . against a subsequent purchaser for value who acquired
the property in reliance on the tax sale. The purchaser may conclu-
sively presume that the tax sale was valid and shall have full title to
the property free and clear of the right, title, and interest of any per-
son that arose before the tax sale . . . .51
The limitations period for such challenges is one year.52 Although the
Fund knew of the limitations period, it chose not to comply with the stat-
utory time periods and related requirements, opting instead to collater-
ally attack the tax lien sale after the limitations period had expired.53 The
Fund claimed that it stood in the shoes of SF3 and could challenge the tax
lien sale’s validity because its predecessor-in-interest did not receive no-
tice of the sale. The Fund cited Security State Bank & Trust v. Bexar
County,54 where a lienholder at the time of a tax sale had not received
notice of the sale and later challenged the sale by a suit filed four days
after the one-year limitations period had run, without making the re-
quired statutory deposit.55 In Security State Bank, the San Antonio Court
of Appeals held that, notwithstanding the delinquent filing and failure to
make a deposit, the lienholder had proper standing to challenge the tax
sale as void as to such lienholder.56 However, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals noted that Security State Bank was distinguishable because a
lienholder stands in a different position than a property owner and could
collaterally attack a tax sale judgment after the statutory period applica-
ble to a property owner.57
The Pirkle court of appeals distinguished Security State Bank, noting
that the lienholder in that case did not have notice of the lawsuit, whereas
in this case the Fund actually acquired the deed of trust by transfer with
full knowledge of the tax lawsuit, the judgment, the tax sale, and the re-
cord of the sale deed.58 However, in another provision of the Pirkle opin-
ion, the court of appeals indicated that the Fund only learned of Pirkle’s
interest six months after recording the Pirkle tax sale deed.59 Therefore,
50. Id. at 512.
51. TAX § 34.08 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. § 33.54.
53. Pirkle, 475 S.W.3d at 514.
54. 397 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied).
55. Pirkle, 475 S.W.3d at 514–15.
56. Id. at 514.
57. Id. at 514-515.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 521.
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the court of appeals is actually discussing the Fund’s constructive notice
as opposed to its actual notice. The court of appeals confirmed that the
tax statute required notice to an existing lienholder, that SF3 was an ex-
isting lienholder of record, that SF3 should have received notice of the
tax suit, and that SF3 would have had the right to collaterally attack the
tax judgment outside the limitations period.60 Since SF3 did not attack
the judgment, but sold its deed of trust to the Fund, the question was
whether the Fund could assert the due process rights held by SF3 at the
time of the tax sale. As stated by the court of appeals, “whether a
lienholder’s right to challenge a tax judgment and sale based upon due-
process violations is assignable at all appears to be an issue of first im-
pression in Texas.”61
The general rule in Texas is that “causes of action are freely assigna-
ble”;62 however, there are exceptions to the standard rule.63 Such excep-
tions involve applying public policy and considering the equities
involved.64 In analyzing whether due process claims can be assigned, a
court must inquire into various notions of equity and public policy. The
court discussed six types of equities applicable to the current case65: (1)
equity favoring diligence; (2) public policy favoring limitations; (3) public
policy favoring free and clear title; (4) public policy disfavoring promot-
ing litigation; (5) collateral attacks being disfavored; and (6) considera-
tions of comity.66
As to diligence, the court of appeals concluded that the Fund had ac-
cess to recorded information, that it should have determined the exis-
tence of the tax lien sale, and that it should not be rewarded for such
neglect.67 On the other hand, the authors suggest that this duty is partially
or wholly offset by the diligence that should have been undertaken by the
taxing authority in identifying the existing lienholders at the time of the
60. Id. at 516.
61. Id. at 517.
62. Id. (citing City of Brownsville ex rel. Pub. Utils. Bd. v. AEP Tex. Cent. Co., 348
S.W.3d 348, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied)).
63. Id. (citing HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Watson, 377 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2012, pet. dism’d) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.
1996))).
64. Id. at 518. The court cites four instances of invalidity of the general rule of assigna-
bility of due process claims: (1) legal malpractice claims, id. (citing Zuniga v. Groce, Locke
& Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 314, 317–18 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ ref’d)); (2)
“Mary Carter” agreements (the assignment of part of a settling plaintiff’s claim against
nonsettling defendants to a settling defendant), id. (citing Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240,
242, 246–50 (Tex. 1992)); (3) assignments from a tortfeasor of the right to sue a joint
tortfeasor, id. (citing Int’l Proteins Corp. v. Ralston-Purina Co., 744 S.W.2d 932, 933–34
(Tex. 1988)); and (4) assignments relating to an estate interest, id. (citing Trevino v.
Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 684–88 (Tex. 1978)).
65. Id. at 519. Although the court of appeals claims that Gandy and HSBC required
courts to analyze equity and public policy, the authors disagree with this interpretation as it
relates to HSBC because the HSBC court held that assignment of the due process right was
not against public policy and would be allowed. Id. at 517 (citing HSBC Bank USA, 377
S.W.3d at 755).
66. Id. at 519–26.
67. Id. at 519–20.
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tax lien suit and appropriately joining them in the litigation. It seems
somewhat incongruous to allow the taxing authority’s negligence in bring-
ing suit to be totally overridden by a purchaser’s negligent review of the
deed records or reliance upon the tax jurisdiction’s failure to provide ap-
propriate notice as required by the statute.
Next, the court of appeals addressed the public policy favoring limita-
tions, citing cases holding that it is “in society’s best interest . . . that
disputes be settled or barred within a reasonable time.”68 The Fund knew
about the suit in time to file within the statutory period, but delayed tak-
ing action until the statutory period expired. Under these facts, the court
of appeals held that the Fund should not be entitled to collaterally attack
the judgment.69 However, in the spirit of “bad facts make bad case law,”
what would have been the outcome if the Fund had not acquired the
deed-of-trust lien from SF3 only months after the foreclosure sale and
within the limitation periods, but rather, over a year after the tax sale?
Under those circumstances, the Fund would not have been able to chal-
lenge within the statutory period of time and would have been required
to rely upon a collateral attack. Is this a distinction the courts really want
to sanction?
The third public policy was the favoring of free and clear title.70 The
court of appeals cited to similar concepts from various jurisdictions’ tax-
sale statutes.71 However, the court of appeals did not discuss whether the
other jurisdictions require notice to all existing tax lienholders as a condi-
tion to free and clear title. Furthermore, in the authors’ opinion, it is no
less appropriate for the taxing authority at a foreclosure sale to convey
title subject to claims by other interest holders that were not noticed in
the original suit. To do otherwise would promote litigation (as happened
in Pirkle), which is against the public policy at issue, as well as another
public policy (preventing litigation) cited by the court. Further, since tax
liens take super priority over and can adversely affect a first lienholder
who has taken no inappropriate actions to lose its lien position, it is no
less a matter of public policy that the legislature and the courts should
protect such first lienholders by requiring notice to them or transfer of
title subject to their interests.
The fourth public policy disfavored the promotion of litigation.72 The
court of appeals concluded that by cutting off the Fund’s rights to collat-
erally attack, it was furthering this public policy.73 However, as men-
tioned before, the failure to provide notice to SF3 would not have
prevented further litigation if the sale of the deed of trust had not oc-
curred until over a year after the tax sale. In that event, the attempted
68. Id. at 520 (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex.
2001)).
69. Id. at 521.
70. Id. at 522.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 524.
73. Id.
2017] Real Property 379
sale by SF3 of its deed of trust would have revealed its loss of the deed-
of-trust lien, thereby requiring SF3 to collaterally attack the tax lien judg-
ment. The position of the court of appeals does not deter further litiga-
tion, but ensures that further litigation will be necessary due to the taxing
authority’s failure to provide appropriate notices to all lienholders of re-
cord at the time of the tax suit.
The fifth public policy disfavored collateral attacks.74 Again, as noted
above, this position would not have prevented a collateral attack by SF3
for a transfer more than one year after the tax sale. Taking this position as
to an assignee seems to ignore the true realities of the situation.
Finally, the last public policy was comity.75 The court of appeals con-
cluded that it would be inappropriate to alter the judicial scheme adopted
by the Texas legislature, which provided appropriate due process rights.76
However, the court of appeals brushes off a contrary holding in In re
Paxton,77 which found no reversible error where a mortgage assignee was
allowed to pursue the assignor’s due process claims.78
While many of the points made by the court of appeals are accurate,
the authors believe that the primary rationale for this holding was the
Fund’s bad faith79 in not pursuing its claims timely under the Texas Tax
Code provision when it had sufficient notice and opportunity to do so. In
this sense, the authors believe this case would have been more appropri-
ately decided on a narrow ruling based on the Fund’s failure to take ap-
propriate actions readily available to it. Instead, the court announced a
new rule of law prohibiting all deed-of-trust assignees from asserting the
due process rights of their assignor, which would not make sense in nu-
merous cases, as noted above.
H. RESCISSION OF ACCELLERATION
During the Survey period, there were a number of cases dealing with
the abandonment or rescission of an acceleration of a debt. As a prelude
to discussion of these cases, Texas law provides for rescission or waiver of
74. Id.
75. Id. at 525.
76. Id. at 525–26.
77. 440 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2006).
78. Pirkle, 475 S.W.3d at 526 n.21.
79. For example, the court of appeals makes the following statements reflecting its
general displeasure with the position and attitude taken by the Fund: (1) “[The Fund],
aware of the tax code and its provisions . . . simply chose to ignore its statutory remedies.”
Id. at 526. (2) “[The Fund] should have known about the tax sale and constable’s deed . . .,
[and] certainly the record establishes that . . . [the Fund] actually knew that the tax sale had
occurred.” Id. at 527. (3) “[The Fund] acquired its lien on the property with full notice of
the delinquent tax law suit, the judgment . . ., and the resulting tax sale itself. “ Id. at 515
(even though the authors have already pointed out that these were only constructive no-
tices and not actual notices). (4) “[The Fund] was aware of the . . . tax sale. . . . [The Fund]
was still within the applicable limitations period . .  . [The Fund] had more than seven
months to . . . file the challenge . . . .” Id. at 521. (5) “[The Fund] had more than ample
opportunity to comply with the tax code and challenge the tax sale during the applicable
period of limitations . . . .” Id.
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acceleration pursuant to the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.80
In relevant part, this statute provides that once an acceleration has oc-
curred, and assuming that the limitation period has not expired, the accel-
eration can be rescinded or waived by written notice from the lienholder
to each debtor, served by first class or certified mail, postage prepaid, and
“addressed to the debtor at the debtor’s last known address.”81 This stat-
utory framework is not an exclusive method for the waiver or rescission
of acceleration,82 and the two cases discussed below relate to other means
of the rescission or waiver of acceleration.
In Stewart v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n,83 U.S. Bank, the mortgage
holder, accelerated the indebtedness of a home equity note made by
Stewart on September 29, 2008. Two years later, the parties entered into a
forbearance agreement delaying further action by the lender. After sub-
sequent defaults, the lender eventually sent a notice of default, notice of
acceleration, and notice of foreclosure sale in 2012. Stewart filed a suit on
September 24, 2013, to prevent the foreclosure.84 At the time of suit, the
action was more than four years from the date of the initial acceleration,
but less than four years from the date of the forbearance agreement. Con-
sequently, the issue was whether the forbearance agreement constituted a
waiver, rescission or abandonment of the acceleration.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas concluded
that the forbearance agreement constituted an abandonment of the accel-
eration and a reinstatement of the original terms of the note, noting that
“[a] forbearance agreement . . . establish[ing] monthly payments in ex-
change for not foreclosing,” and which otherwise does not declare the full
amount immediately due and payable, “constitute[d] an agreement to
abandon acceleration.”85 Further, an agreement for the tender and ac-
ceptance of payments less than the full amount due constituted an agree-
ment for abandonment of an acceleration.86 Although Stewart contended
that the failure to specifically mention a reinstatement prohibited the
abandonment, the district court concluded that “abandoning acceleration
does not require an explicitly stated agreement that the original maturity
date is restored” and “[b]ecause the Forbearance Agreement did not pro-
vide a different maturity date, the original maturity date of the Note re-
mained in full force and effect.”87
The district court also rejected the argument that the forbearance
agreement provision providing that the loan would not be current did not
80. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.038 (West 2002).
81. Id. § 16.038(b), (c).
82. Id. § 16.038(e).
83. 107 F. Supp. 3d 705 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
84. Id. at 707.
85. Id. at 709 (citing Rosas v. Am.’s Servicing Co. (In re Rosas), 520 B.R. 534, 540–42
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2014)).
86. Id. (citing Clawson v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-00212, 2013 WL 1948128,
at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2013)).
87. Id. at 709–10 (citing Khan v. GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.)).
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mean that the acceleration continued.88 An additional argument by Stew-
art was that since the forbearance agreement did not inhibit the exercise
of any rights available after acceleration, that acceleration could not be
deemed abandoned.89 This argument was rejected since no provision of
the forbearance agreement specifically retained the bank’s rights that
were available after acceleration.90 Based on this opinion, if the accelera-
tion is to be maintained during the pendency of the forbearance agree-
ment, practitioners should include specific provisions providing that an
abandonment of the acceleration is not intended. Additionally, practi-
tioners should reiterate the accelerated maturity and assert the lender’s
current right to pursue foreclosure or other remedies available after the
acceleration.
The other rescission case, Boren v. U.S. National Bank Ass’n,91 ad-
dressed an issue of first impression as to whether a lienholder could uni-
laterally abandon its acceleration of a note. The home equity loan
defaulted, a default was declared, acceleration of the debt occurred, and
the lienholder filed for a Rule 73692 application for foreclosure. The
above scenario occurred on four separate occasions from 2009 through
2013. On the final occurrence, the homeowner alleged that the foreclo-
sure action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations. The bank
countered that it had unilaterally abandoned its acceleration. In under-
taking its “Erie guess,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reviewed various Texas appellate court opinions to determine how the
Texas Supreme Court would decide such issue.93 Texas courts had used
traditional principles of waiver in analyzing these cases and the elements
of waiver.94 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the creditor’s subsequent
notice of default, allowing the debtor to pay less than the whole amount
due, was the equivalent of a unilateral abandonment of the acceleration
of the debt.95 Practitioners should be wary of this holding when dealing
with accelerated debt and how the actions of the creditor might be con-
strued as a unilateral rescission.
88. Id. at 710.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 807 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 2015).
92. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 736.8 (requiring an abbreviated court determination as a con-
dition precedent to foreclosure under a home equity loan in Texas); see also TEX. R. CIV.
P. 736.1.
93. See Boren, 807 F.3d at 105.
94. The Fifth Circuit quoted those elements as including “(1) an existing right, benefit,
or advantage held by a party; (2) the party’s actual knowledge of its existence; and (3) the
party’s actual intent to relinquish the right, or intentional conduct inconsistent with the
right.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Ass’n, 783 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir.
2015) (quoting Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008))).
95. Id. at 106.
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I. HOME EQUITY LIEN – CONSTITUTIONAL FORFEITURES
AND LIMITATIONS
The Texas Supreme Court has issued two important cases on the forfei-
ture and limitation provisions with respect to Texas home-equity loans. In
Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C.,96 a homeowner performed
under its loan and paid off the loan on April 1, 2014. Ocwen recorded a
release of lien on April 28, 2014, but did not furnish a copy of the release
to Garofolo as required by the terms of her home-equity documents.
Garofolo notified Ocwen of the failure and gave the required sixty-day
notice to cure, but Ocwen did nothing. After the cure period expired,
Garofolo sued Ocwen for violating the home-equity lending provisions of
the Texas Constitution.97 Because Ocwen did not return the cancelled
promissory note and deliver a recordable release of lien, Garofolo sought
forfeiture, under the applicable constitutional provisions, of principal and
interest on the home-equity loan.
The supreme court addressed this in answers to two questions certified
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, framing the issue as
whether a home-equity lender’s subsequent breach of the constitutional
requirements for a home-equity loan would create a cause of action
under the Texas Constitution.98 The applicable constitutional provision
required the lender, after full payment of the loan, to return to the bor-
rower the cancelled promissory note and a release of lien in recordable
form.99 To enforce the strict home-equity lending rules, a forfeiture of
principal and interest is mandated if the constitutional requirements are
not complied with or are not cured within the sixty-day cure period after
notice.100 The supreme court concluded that there was no constitutionally
protected right to shield the debtor from foreclosure, but that the right of
protection from foreclosure must be asserted under the loan documents’
contractual provisions.101 As to the first certified question, the supreme
court stated, “The constitution prohibits foreclosure when a home-equity
loan fails to include a constitutionally mandated term or condition, but it
does not address post-origination enforcement of a loan’s provisions.”102
The dissenting justices concurred with this holding.103
The second question addressed by the supreme court was on the issue
of forfeiture of principal and interest because the lender failed to return a
cancelled promissory note and deliver a recordable release of lien within
the constitutionally and contractually required sixty-day notice and cure
period. Understanding the draconian nature of the forfeiture provision,
the supreme court inquired whether Ocwen could have satisfied one of
96. 497 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. 2016).
97. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a).
98. Garofolo, 497 S.W.3d at 475.
99. Id. at 477; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(vii).
100. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x).
101. Garofolo, 497 S.W.3d at 478.
102. Id. at 479.
103. See id. at 489 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
2017] Real Property 383
the six corrective measures presented by the constitution.104 The first five
curative provisions were clearly inapplicable for a cure, so the “catch-all”
curative provision was considered but also dismissed as inapplicable.105
Concluding that none of the six corrective measures represented an ap-
propriate cure, the supreme court decided that the intent of the forfeiture
provision was to encourage lenders to correct the underlying noncomp-
liant provisions.106 Rather than strictly construe the statutory language,
the supreme court found that the curative provisions “do not speak to
every manifestation of a lender’s failure to comply.”107 Therefore, absent
a constitutional remedy, the borrower had only contractual damage rem-
edies.108 In other words, a constitutionally-mandated forfeiture would not
be available if any of the six specific corrective measures did not apply.109
Justices Boyd and Johnson dissented to this conclusion, reasoning that the
catch-all curative provision was applicable because it was constitutionally
mandated and practically available.110
An interesting aspect of this case is that, although the supreme court
acknowledged that Ocwen recorded a release of lien, there is no discus-
sion as to why the recording of a release of lien is not a cure equivalent to
delivery of a recordable release of lien; it would be cheaper for the bor-
rower and would avoid requiring extra (and often unfamiliar) actions to
be taken.111 What if, after recording the release of lien, Ocwen had re-
sponded to the borrower’s demand with a letter providing a copy of the
recorded release or a letter advising of the recording with a promise to
furnish the release when available? Since a recorded document is public
record, one would think that the supreme court could have found a more
narrow basis to support its position instead of requiring a suit for contrac-
tual damages. However, unless further clarification is forthcoming, the
Texas rule of law is now that a home-equity lender who fails to perform
post-payment obligations will be liable pursuant to only contractual dam-
age remedies and will not be subject to a constitutional forfeiture.
Another home-equity case, Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,112 in-
volved the charging of excessive fees in connection with a home-equity
loan. The home-equity debtors in this case (Wood) waited eight years
104. The sixty-day cure period allows for correction of a noncompliant provision by
taking one of six specified actions: (1) refunding overcharge payments; (2) providing writ-
ten acknowledgment of the validity of the lien in the appropriate amount; (3) providing
written notice modifying the illegal provisions to bring them into compliance and making
appropriate adjustments as necessary; (4) delivering required loan-closing documents; (5)
providing written notice of abatement of interest in certain cases; and (6) if none of the
foregoing five curative actions are applicable, paying $1,000 and offering to refinance the
existing credit. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(a)(6)(Q)(x)(a)–(f).
105. Garofolo, 497 S.W.3d at 482.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 484.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 487–89 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
111. See id. at 481–82.
112. 505 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. 2016).
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after closing to notify the lender that it had violated the home-equity re-
quirements regarding fees exceeding 3% of the loan amount and sued the
lender for the constitutional forfeiture of principal and interest. In de-
fense to Wood’s allegations, the lender countered that the claims were
barred by the statute of limitations. Based on the Garofolo case, decided
earlier that day, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that Wood did not
have a constitutional right to forfeiture but had to rely on a breach-of-
contract action and damages arising therefrom.113
The statute of limitations issue deals with a different provision of the
Texas Constitution.114 Since the suit was brought eight years after the
loan closing, the action would be barred by limitation unless the borrower
could prove that the limitations period was inapplicable because the deed
of trust was a void instrument; the four-year statute of limitations applied
to a voidable instrument. Also coming into play in this decision was the
Texas Supreme Court’s prior decision in Doody v. Ameriquest Mortgage
Co.,115 where the supreme court held that a home mortgage lien that was
noncompliant with constitutional requirements could be made valid at a
later date if the right to cure existed under the constitution or statutes.116
The supreme court wrestled with the appropriate characterization of this
instrument in light of the constitutional provision and the long line of
Texas cases holding that the limitations period applies to suits seeking to
invalidate constitutionally defective homestead liens, while distinguishing
its holding in Doody on the theory that it related to the constitutional
cure provisions as opposed to an invalid lien under the provisions of Sec-
tion 50(c).117 Creation of a new common law category of lien (i.e., void
until cured) was specifically disclaimed, and the plain language of Section
50(c) was interpreted as being one that “defies common-law
categorization.”118
However, the dissent by Chief Justice Hecht asserted that the majority
opinion “inject[s] instability into land titles” and that such position “has
been rejected by the Fifth Circuit and by four Texas Courts of Appeals—
every appellate court that has considered the matter.”119 In contrast, the
majority distinguished the long line of cases, relying on Rivera v. Country-
wide Home Loans, Inc.,120 which they viewed as having incorrectly cited
Rivera for the proposition that the four-year limitations period applies to
constitutionally defective homestead liens, noting that the issues
presented in Rivera related only to the time of accrual of action rather
than the application of a limitations period.121 The supreme court sup-
113. Id. at 546, 551.
114. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50(c) (providing, in relevant part, that “[n]o . . . lien
on the homestead shall ever be valid unless it secures a debt described by this section”).
115. 49 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2001).
116. Wood, 505 S.W.3d at 548–49 (citing Doody, 49 S.W.3d at 345–47).
117. Id. at 548–50.
118. Id. at 549.
119. Id. at 552 (Hecht, C.J., dissenting).
120. 262 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).
121. Wood, 505 S.W.3d at 548.
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ported its position by reading the applicable constitutional provision as
indicating that no lien on a homestead “shall ever be valid” unless the
debt instrument meets the applicable requirements.122 Therefore, “consti-
tutionally noncompliant loans are invalid before the defect is cured” and
“no statute of limitations applies to cut off a homeowner’s right to quiet
title to real property encumbered by an invalid lien under section
50(c).”123 As of this time, the statute of limitations is not a valid defense
against a homeowner’s right to invalidate a noncompliant home-equity
lien.124
III. DEBTOR/CREDITOR
A. TURNOVER ORDERS – COUNTERCLAIMS
A turnover order was at issue in In re Great Northern Energy, Inc.125
Circle Ridge Production had obtained a judgment in a suit against Great
Northern Energy and, as part of the collection efforts, obtained a turno-
ver order with respect to various matters, including Great Northern’s
counterclaim in another lawsuit entitled Baker v. Great Northern Energy,
Inc.126 This decision arose out of a request for a writ of mandamus on the
existing turnover order, which can only be granted if there is an inade-
quate remedy by appeal.127 Generally, “turnover orders are final appeal-
able orders” that “must be attacked on direct appeal”;128 however, there
is an exception allowing mandamus where appellate remedy is inade-
quate due to special circumstances.129 Inadequate appellate remedies in-
clude “those that (1) violate public policy, (2) violate the open-courts
doctrine, and (3) extinguish a cause of action.”130
Great Northern showed that the counterclaim subject to the turnover
order represented a defensive action in its Baker lawsuit and constituted
a significant portion of its defense strategy, and that the turnover order
creditor, Circle Ridge, had no desire to pursue the claim against Baker,
but would merely sell the counterclaim rights to Baker in settlement of a
portion of Circle Ridge’s judgment. In these circumstances, the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals concluded that such action would violate both the
open court doctrine and the extinguishment of a cause of action doctrine,
thereby entitling Great Northern to a mandamus action to vacate the
turnover order as to such counterclaim.131
122. Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. XVI § 50(c)).
123. Id. at 550.
124. Id. at 550–52.
125. 493 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2016, orig. proceeding).
126. See 64 F. Supp. 3d 965 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
127. In re Great Northern, 493 S.W.3d at 286.
128. Id. at 288–89.
129. Id. at 290.
130. Id. (citing Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1992, no writ.)).
131. Id. at 291.
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B. INDEPENDENT SUITS DURING BANKRUPTCY
In Judgment Factors, L.L.C. v. Packer (In re Packer),132 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed a creditor’s rights to indepen-
dently assert alter ego and reverse veil piercing theories against its judg-
ment debtor during the pendency of a bankruptcy. Judgment Factors had
obtained an assignment of a judgment against Packer.133 In pursuing the
acquired judgment claim, Judgment Factors filed suit alleging various ac-
tivities that constituted a bar to discharge in bankruptcy, including alter
ego and reverse veil piercing claims. However, such claims resided with
the bankruptcy trustee, as they are “property of the estate” and may not
be brought independently by a creditor.134 Since the judgment creditor in
this case failed to prove that the bankruptcy trustee unjustifiably refused
to pursue the claim and to obtain the bankruptcy court’s permission to
pursue the claim on behalf of the estate, the judgment creditor was not
entitled to an independent cause of action.135
C. NON-WAIVER PROVISION
In Martin v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, the inclusion of a “non-
waiver” provision in a deed of trust was instrumental in a holding in favor
of the lienholder.136 Martin executed a deed of trust with a non-waiver
provision, subsequently defaulted on payments, and a foreclosure sale oc-
curred.137 Martin missed a December 9, 2009 payment, but continued to
make subsequent payments until May and June of 2011. A notice of fore-
closure was sent in June, 2011 and foreclosure occurred in July, 2011.
Martin alleged that the acceptance of payments for sixteen months after
the initial default constituted a waiver of the right to foreclose by the
mortgagee.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the non-
waiver provision applied to this claim.138 Relying on general Texas law of
waivers, as discussed above in Boren,139 the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the non-waiver provision allowed the lender to accept payments that
were smaller than the entirety and to postpone acceleration or foreclo-
sure without waiving any rights, and further that the lender was engaged
132. 816 F.3d 87 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
133. Actually, the principals of Judgment Factors were the spouses of prior partners of
Packer, whose prior partners were also joint defendants with Packer, and the prior part-
ners with Packer were all subject to the same judgment claim. Id. at 89–91.
134. Id. at 92 (citing Cadle Co. v. Mims (In re Moore), 608 F.3d 253, 258–59 (5th Cir.
2010)).
135. Id.
136. Martin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 814 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2016).
137. The relevant provisions of the non-waiver provision are as follows: “Any forbear-
ance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender’s
acceptance of payments from third persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower
or in amounts less than the amount then due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the
exercise of any right or remedy.” Id. at 316.
138. Id. at 317.
139. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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in conduct contemplated and permitted by the non-waiver provision.140
While the Fifth Circuit discussed other actions that may constitute a
waiver of rights, this case is an important reminder to practitioners to
include these “boilerplate” provisions to assure maximum flexibility in
asserting non-waiver rights.141
IV. GUARANTIES/INDEMNITIES
A. ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
In Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc. v. Orix Capital Markets
LLC,142 the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether an order under
Texas Property Code Section 52.0011143 was appealable. Although the fil-
ing of an abstract of judgment by a judgment creditor against a guarantor
constitutes a lien on the real estate of the guarantor,144 there is an excep-
tion to that rule. Under Section 52.0011, the abstract of judgment is not a
lien if appropriate security has been posted and the trial court makes a
determination based on a balancing between the lien rights of the credi-
tor and the cost of and effects upon the defendant after exhausting all
appellate remedies.145 The court of appeals concluded that such a statu-
tory exception was appropriately characterized as ancillary to the original
court judgment and could not be appealed independently of the
judgment.146
B. CHANGE OF NOTICE ADDRESS
The importance of a guarantor providing updates to its mailing address
under notice provisions in a guaranty document is highlighted in Nuss-
baum v. Builders Bank.147 Because Nussbaum failed to provide an update
in his guaranty notice address, a suit on the guaranty ended in a default
judgment that Nussbaum was barely able to overturn in a bill of review.
The original service of process to Nussbaum’s guaranty notice address
went through the Texas Secretary of State and was returned as undeliver-
able, supported by a “Whitney” certificate from the Texas Secretary of
State.148 In Builders Bank’s summary judgment motion and supporting
affidavit, the bank verified that it mailed a copy of the order to the guar-
antor’s address, which was a new address to which the guarantor had
moved. However, Builders Bank’s affidavit of last known address recited
the guaranty notice address, not the new address. The Fort Worth Court
of Appeals originally ruled that Nussbaum was negligent in failing to up-
140. Martin, 814 F.3d at 319.
141. Id. at 318–319.
142. 470 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).
143. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.0011 (West 2014).




147. 478 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. denied).
148. Id. at 107.
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date his address, which prohibited him from challenging the default judg-
ment.149 However, in the recently decided Texas Supreme Court case,
Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., the Texas Supreme Court
drew a distinction between a defendant’s negligence in updating its regis-
tered agent address and a plaintiff’s knowing use of an outdated address
in its certificate of last known address for purposes of Rule 239a.150 Since
the Builders Bank affidavit reflected the wrong last known address, the
court of appeals determined that it was a sufficient basis for the bill of
review on behalf of the guarantor.151 This case should be sufficient warn-
ing for practitioners to advise their guarantor and other clients to dili-
gently provide updates to official notice addresses in documents as well as
registered agent addresses with the Secretary of State.
C. GUARANTEED INDEBTEDNESS
Abel v. Alexander Oil Co.152 involved the strict construction of a guar-
anty. Abel signed a personal guaranty for John Steele’s sole proprietor-
ship, John Steele Trucking, in favor of Alexander Oil. John Steele’s wife
and Abel’s daughter, Shannon Steele, later formed a separate entity
called John Steele Trucking, LLC. John Steele Trucking had an open ac-
count with Alexander Oil, but after the formation of the limited liability
company by Shannon Steele, the new company began using the account
on behalf of John Steele Trucking, LLC. After default on this account,
Alexander Oil sued Abel under her personal guaranty. The guaranty lan-
guage specified that Abel guaranteed “all amounts due by [John Steele
Trucking] to Alexander Oil Company.”153 The confusion in this case con-
cerned the jury instructions and answers, which determined that John
Steele was personally liable for the obligations of John Steele Trucking,
LLC. However, as the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals properly
noted, the guaranty related only to obligations of the sole proprietorship,
John Steele Trucking, and not to obligations of John Steele personally
with respect to a third party principal (i.e., John Steele Trucking, LLC).154
Consequently, Abel was not liable under her guaranty for debts owed by
John Steele with respect to a party other than his sole proprietorship.155
This case provides guidance to practitioners to carefully draft guaranties,
particularly with respect to the description of whose obligations are being
guaranteed.
149. Id. at 109.
150. Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. 2015) (per
curiam); TEX. R. CIV. P. 239a.
151. Nussbaum, 478 S.W.3d at 110.
152. 474 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
153. Id. at 797.
154. Id. at 801.
155. Id.
2017] Real Property 389
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A. REMEDIES; CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Jetall Companies, Inc. v. Four Seasons Food Distributors, Inc.,156 pro-
vides the practitioner with a very simple reminder: “One cannot convey a
right which one does not have.”157 In Jetall, the Four Seasons was the
highest bidder in an auction for a shopping center.158 The purchase and
sale agreement contained a provision stating, “Buyer shall not assign this
Agreement or its rights hereunder to any individual or entity without the
prior written consent of Seller, which consent Seller may grant or with-
hold in its sole and absolute discretion, and any such assignment shall be
null and void ab initio.”159 After executing the purchase and sale agree-
ment, Four Seasons changed its mind and entered into a one page assign-
ment with Jetall, the second highest bidder.160 The assignment provided
in relevant part “Assignor does hereby assign all right, title and interest
of Assignor under the [purchase and sale] Agreement . . . to Assignee.”161
Four Seasons attempted to negotiate with the seller of the property for
their consent to the assignment but was unsuccessful.162 Ultimately, Four
Seasons decided to go through with the purchase of the property despite
the assignment to Jetall.163 Jetall sued Four Seasons for breach of the
assignment.164 In the motion for summary judgment filed by Four Sea-
sons, Four Seasons claimed that “Jetall’s breach of contract claim is fore-
closed as a matter of law because (1) the June 16, 2011 assignment
agreement is void ab initio; (2) any breach is excused by the failure of a
condition precedent; and (3) any breach is excused by the mutual mis-
take.”165 The trial court granted the Four Seasons’ motion for summary
judgment and Jetall appealed.166 Jetall contended that the anti-assign-
ment clause was in a contract between Four Seasons and the Seller, not
the Four Seasons and Jetall and, therefore, the rights and remedies of the
contract between Four Seasons and Jetall could not be rendered moot by
an agreement to which Jetall was not a party.167 The Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals disagreed with Jetall’s analysis and emphasized that
under Texas common law “an assignee . . . stands in the shoes of the
assignor.”168
156. 474 S.W.3d 780 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet).
157. Id. at 783 (citing Camco Int’l, Inc. v. Perry R. Bass, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ denied); Carter v. Assocs. Disc. Corp., 550 S.W.2d 399, 401
(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1977, no writ)).
158. Id. at 781.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 781–82.





166. Id. at 782.
167. Id. at 783.
168. Id. (citing Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Tex. 1994)); see also Davis v.
Ward, 905 S.W.2d 446, 447 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
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In Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. v. Marathon Oil Co., the El Paso Court of
Appeals addressed what it referred to as “the well-established rule in
Texas that a cause of action for injury to land is a personal right belonging
to the person who owns the property at the time of injury, and that a
mere subsequent purchaser does not have standing to recover for injuries
committed before his purchase.”169 In Ranchero, the plaintiff purchased
property in 2004 that contained multiple oil wells, including one that had
been plugged and abandoned in 1989 by Marathon Oil Company.170 In
2008, injection activity being conducted at a proximate location suppos-
edly caused the well plugged in 1989 to leak salt water, which in turn
caused fairly extensive surface damage.171 The crux of the case was the
argument between the plaintiff and defendant regarding how to define
when the injury occurred.172 Did the legal injury occur when the well was
negligently plugged or when the salt water leaked from the well?173 The
trial court found that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue the defen-
dant because the plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser and did not own
the property when the damage occurred.174 The court of appeals reversed
the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff did not have standing.175 Instead,
the court of appeals found that the injury occurred during the plaintiff’s
ownership of the property because, until the “plug allegedly failed and
caused surface damages,” there was no cause of action.176
Marx v. FDP, LP concerns a dispute over a farm and ranch contract.177
Robert and Debbie Marx were the sellers in the contract and FDP, LP
was the buyer.178 The farm and ranch contract at issue was for the
purchase of approximately 500 acres.179 In addition to the purchase of the
500 acres, which was to be paid for with a $300,000.00 payment and a
seller-financed note for the balance, the contract contained the following
“Special Provisions”:
Buyer and Seller agree to the following details to be worked out
before closing: 1. Seller will survey out approximately 21 acres which
will not [be] convey[ed] with this sale. 2. Seller will sign a first right
of refusal and option agreement for the 21 acres which will allow
buyer to purchase the property in the future. 3. Seller will retain an
easement for access to the 21 acres. 4. Seller agrees to fence the 21
acres within 120 days after closing.180
169. Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. v. Marathon Oil Co., 488 S.W.3d 354, 355–56 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
170. Id. at 356.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 359.
173. Id. at 359–60.
174. Id. at 356.
175. Id. at 366.
176. Id. at 356, 363.




180. Id. (alteration in original).
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When the Marxes refused to sell the property to FDP, FDP and the
Marxes entered into a mediated settlement agreement which provided
for: (1) FDP to purchase 421 acres at $5,000 per acre per “Closing per
existing EMK—October 1, 2013”; (2) the Marxes would hold their home-
stead property for up to eight years; (3) the homestead property would be
pursuant to mutual agreement; (4) if mutual agreement was not possible,
the issue would be settled by arbitration; (5) FDP retained its right of first
refusal on the homestead property; and (6) all claims were mutually re-
leased.181 When the Marxes again refused to perform, FDP went to court
to enforce the settlement agreement.182 The Marxes responded by argu-
ing that the mediated settlement agreement was not subject to specific
performance because it was ambiguous and contained certain “uncertain”
terms, which included:
the size, location and boundaries of the land to be sold; the identity
of the buyer, the manner in which the sale price is to be paid; the
portion of the sale price which is to be paid in cash; and the portion
of the sales price which is to be owner financed.183
The trial court sent the parties back to mediation which was ultimately
unsuccessful.184 FDP moved for specific performance, which was granted
by the trial court and ultimately affirmed by the San Antonio Court of
Appeals.185
On appeal, the Marxes argued to the court of appeals that: (1) the op-
tion to purchase the Homestead was unenforceable for lack of considera-
tion; (2) they rescinded their consent to the settlement agreement; (3) the
settlement agreement lacked certain facts regarding how the purchase
would be financed, so there was “no meeting of the minds . . . as to those
material and essential” elements which precluded enforcement of the set-
tlement agreement; and (4) FDP’s motion for summary judgment failed
to address the Marxes’s affirmative defenses.186 The court of appeals did
not address the issue of their rescinded consent because they found that
the Marxes did not sufficiently brief the issue.187 The court of appeals
instead focused on the Marxes’s argument that there was no meeting of
the minds on the financing of the purchase.188 Ultimately, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision because the Marxes argued dif-
ferent concepts at the trial court level than they argued to the appeals
court.189 The Marxes argued ambiguity at the trial level, centering around
the fact that the settlement agreement changed certain numbers in the
original purchase contract without changing all the numbers, which there-
181. Id. at 371–72.
182. Id. at 372.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 373.
186. Id. at 373, 375.
187. Id. at 375.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 377.
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fore created ambiguity.190 At the court of appeals, the Marxes argued
indefiniteness.191 The court of appeals differentiated the legal meaning of
ambiguity from indefiniteness.192 According to the court of appeals, “[a]
contract is ambiguous if ‘the contract language is susceptible to two or
more reasonable interpretations.’”193 If a contract is ambiguous, the
court resolves the ambiguity and the contract is then enforceable.194 In-
definiteness, on the other hand, has a distinct and separate legal meaning
and makes a contract unenforceable because there is no meeting of the
minds.195 As a general rule, courts are reluctant to hold contracts unen-
forceable for indefiniteness and try to interpret contracts “in such a man-
ner as to render performance possible rather than impossible.”196 One
can only guess how the court of appeals would have come out had this
fatal mistake not been made, but the case presents an important caution-
ary tale for practitioners.
B. CONTRACTS FOR DEED
As in years past, courts addressed Chapter 5, Subchapter D of the
Texas Property Code, Executory Contracts for Conveyance, and rein-
forced what some characterize as draconian remedies available under
Subchapter D.197 As the Tyler Court of Appeals explained in Weaks v.
White, a contract for deed is not like your typical secured transaction.198
Under a contract for deed the seller maintains title to the property until
the property has been paid for in its entirety.199 Subchapter D of the
Property Code contains detailed requirements that a seller must comply
with.200 Failure to so comply can result in the buyer having the right to
“‘cancel and rescind’ a contract for deed and ‘receive a full refund of all
payments made to the seller.’”201 In Weaks, the Weakses, as the sellers,
entered into a “Contract for Deed” with White, as the buyer, on June 5,
2002, whereby White agreed to make ten years of installment payments
to purchase a small lot and the accompanying mobile home.202 After al-
190. Id. at 376–77.
191. Id. at 377.
192. Id. at 375–76.
193. Id. at 375 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex.
2003)); accord Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393–94 (Tex. 1983); Thompson v. CPN
Partners, L.P., 23 S.W.3d 64, 71 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet)).
194. Id. at 376.
195. Id. at 376. (citing Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou, 438 S.W.3d 737, 744
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); Wilson v. Wagner, 211 S.W.2d 241, 243
(Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e)).
196. Id. (quoting Guzman v. Acuna, 653 S.W.2d 315, 319 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1983, writ dism’d) (citing Estate of Eberling v. Fair, 546 S.W.2d 329, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Dallas 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
197. Tex. Prop. Code. Ann. §§ 5.061–.085 (West Supp. 2016).
198. Weaks v. White, 479 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, pet. denied).
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Tex. Prop. Code. Ann. §§ 5.069(d)(2), 5.070(b)(2), 5.072(e)(2) (West
2014)).
201. Id. (citing PROP. §§ 5.069(d)(2), 5.070(b)(2), 5.072(e)(2)).
202. Id. at 435.
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most ten years, in December 2011, White stopped making payments.203 In
February, the Weakses made a demand that White pay the total amount
remaining under the contract along with the past due amount.204 Also in
February, the water meter was removed from the property, which effec-
tively shut off White’s access to water.205 White eventually filed suit
against the Weakses for breaches of their duties of good faith and fair
dealing along with Texas Property Code Chapter 5, Subchapter D viola-
tions while still occupying the mobile home.206 The trial court ultimately
ruled in White’s favor and awarded White $43,319.58, plus an additional
$1,000 for violation of Section 5.077 and attorney’s fees, less the rental
value of the property for the months she continued to occupy the mobile
home after she stopped paying on the contract.207 The trial court found
that the rental value of White’s occupation of the Property for the
twenty-one month period from the day White filed suit until judgment
was entered was $7,493.01.208
Among other issues, the Weakses disagreed with the amount the trial
court held they were owed for White’s occupation and appealed.209 The
trial court had limited White’s recovery to the time period after re-
scinding of the contract.210 The Weakses argued that White should have
to pay the rental value for her full occupation of the property over the
almost ten year period.211 The Weakses argued that failing to allocate
White the rental expense during her occupation would result in an “un-
fair windfall.”212 Citing the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Morton v.
Nguyen,213 the court of appeals agreed with the trial court and found that,
while White was entitled to reimbursement for all payments made to the
Weakses, the Weakses were only entitled to reimbursement for the “in-
terim occupation of the property upon cancellation and rescission of the
contract for deed.”214 This case once again presents a warning to all prac-
titioners on the extreme importance of closely adhering to the require-
ments of Chapter 5, Subchapter D of the Texas Property Code in order to
avoid providing buyers with what could amount to a “windfall” in the
form of rent-free occupation of a property over many years.
C. CONDITIONS PRECEDENT VS. COVENANTS
As in years past, during the review period the courts dealt with several





207. Id. at 435–36.
208. Id. at 436.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 435–36.
211. Id. at 436.
212. Id.
213. 412 S.W.3d 506, 509–10 (Tex. 2013).
214. Weaks, 479 S.W.3d at 436 (citing Morton, 412 S.W.3d at 508).
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Projects, LLC vs. PLT Partnership,215 the seller and purchaser entered
into a real estate contract on January 28, 2013. On March 28, 2013, the
buyer did not have sufficient funds to close the transaction and requested
a thirty-day extension from the seller in exchange for $10,000.216 The rel-
evant part of the extension executed by both parties reads as follows: “In
consideration for this 30 day extension Buyer agrees to pay an additional
$10,000 extension fee directly to [the Seller]. This fee is non refundable
and not applicable to the sales price.”217 Although the buyer was unable
to pay the $10,000 when the extension was agreed to, the buyer did
tender a check to the seller with instruction not to deposit the check.218
The buyer executed the extension and provided the signed extension
agreement to the seller on April 4, 2013.219 When the seller still had not
provided the funds by April 9, 2013, the seller sent the buyer an email
that stated “‘there is no existing contractual agreement between’ the
Seller and the Buyer.”220 The buyer sued the seller for breach of contract
and each party filed a motion for summary judgment.221 The trial court
granted the seller’s motion for summary judgment and denied the buyer’s
motion for specific performance.222 The buyer appealed.223 The Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and re-
manded.224 The analysis of the court of appeals primarily relied on its
examination of two separate issues: (1) whether the payment of the
$10,000 was a covenant or a condition;225 and (2) whether the amend-
ment was supported by adequate consideration.226
With respect to the issue of whether the $10,000 was a contractual cov-
enant versus a condition precedent to the extension of the closing date,
the court of appeals noted that although the parties failed to use any of
the special words that generally indicate a condition, such as “if,” “pro-
vided that,” or “on condition that,” the use of such words are not the
determining factor.227 Instead, the court emphasized the need to examine
the contract as a whole to determine the intention of the parties.228 As
the court of appeals noted, the general rule is that “conditions are not
favored in the law” because the consequences of contractual conditions
are harsh.229 Therefore, as the court of appeals noted, if “the intent of the
215. 479 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).









225. Id. at 525–26.
226. Id. at 526.
227. Id. (citing Hirschfeld Steel Co. v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 201 S.W.3d 272, 281
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).
228. Id. at 536.
229. Id. at 526.
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parties is doubtful, courts will interpret the agreement as creating a cove-
nant rather than a condition.”230 Because the parties did not use the “spe-
cial words” and the context of the entire agreement did not otherwise
indicate the parties’ intent to create a condition, the court of appeals
found that the “payment of the $10,000 is not a condition precedent to
the extension of the closing date.”231
The court of appeals then examined the issue of consideration.232 Was
the consideration for the contract extension: (1) the promise to pay the
extension fee; (2) the payment of the extension fee via check without
sufficient funds; or (3) the “valid tender of the fee”?233 The court of ap-
peals found that the consideration was the promise to pay the fee and not
the actual payment of the fee.234
The court of appeals then went on to examine the seller’s related, but
different, argument—that there was never a binding agreement because
there was “failure of consideration.”235 The court of appeals distinguished
a “failure of consideration” from a “lack of consideration” as follows:
failure of consideration is an affirmative defense.236 According to the
court of appeals, “[a] ‘failure of consideration’ does not mean that there
never was any binding amendment.”237 “[F]ailure of consideration” is al-
leged when “a party does not receive the promised performance under a
binding contract.”238 The court of appeals discussed the issue of “failure
of consideration” with respect to the trial court’s holding,239 but they ulti-
mately did not address the issue because the parties had entered into a
Rule 11 Agreement whereby they had agreed that the sole issue to be
addressed by the courts was described as follows:240
ISSUE TO BE DECIDED BY THE COURT: As a matter of law,
was the Amendment to the real estate earnest money contract [to
extend the closing date for the sale of the property] a binding con-
tract between the parties even though [the Buyer] did not pay the
$10,000 extension fee to [the Seller] prior to [the Seller] sending a
letter to [the Buyer] stating that “there is no existing contractual
agreement” between [the Seller] and [the Buyer]?241
230. Id. (citing Hirschfeld Steel Co., 201 S.W.3d at 281).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 526–27.
233. Id. (citing Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Swift Energy Co., 180 S.W.3d
635, 646–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 527.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing Cheung-Loon, LLC v. Cergon, Inc., 392 S.W.3d 738, 747–48 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); Burges v. Mosley, 304 S.W.3d 623, 628–29 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2010, no pet.); Walden v. Affiliated Comput. Servs., 97 S.W.3d 303, 320–21 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 527–28.
240. Id. at 522.
241. Id. at 523 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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As a result, because the parties had limited the issue before the court
to effectively exclude a determination on the failure of consideration, the
court of appeals had no choice but to overrule the trial court’s granting of
a summary judgment motion on behalf of the seller.242
VI. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
A. DAMAGES
In Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. White,243 the Texas Su-
preme Court broadly addressed multiple provisions of the Texas Property
Code with respect to the landlord’s duty to repair. The Philadelphia case
dealt with the enforceability of Section 12 of the Texas Apartment Asso-
ciation form lease and, therefore, is important for every lawyer that rep-
resents landlords in Texas to know and understand. The provision of the
Texas Apartment Association form lease at issue in the Philadelphia case
provides, in part:
DAMAGES AND REIMBURSEMENT. You must promptly pay or
reimburse us for loss, damage, consequential damages, government
fines or charges, or cost of repairs or service in the apartment com-
munity due to: a violation of the Lease Contract or rules; improper
use; negligence; other conduct by you or your invitees, guests or oc-
cupants; or any other cause not due to [the Landlord’s] negligence or
fault. You will indemnify and hold us harmless from all liability aris-
ing from the conduct of you, your invitees, guests, or occupants, or
our representatives who perform at your request services not con-
templated in this Lease Contract.244
The tenant in the Philadelphia case argued that the provision in ques-
tion was not only ambiguous but also a violation of public-policy because
it contradicted Section 92.006(c) of the Texas Property Code245 (generally
prohibiting the waiving of repair duties and available remedies provided
by statute) and Section 92.052246 (outlining the landlord’s duty to re-
pair).247 The insurance company for the landlord argued that “section
92.006’s list of authorized contractual arrangements is permissive, but not
exclusive, and that the Property Code neither prohibits agreements mak-
ing tenants responsible for damages . . . nor requires tenant fault to shift
responsibility for tenant-caused damages.”248
The case involved an extensive apartment fire that occurred in a
clothes dryer owned by the tenant.249 At the trial, the jury had not found
242. Id. at 528.
243. 490 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. 2016).
244. Id. at 472 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
245. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.006(c) (West Supp. 2016).
246. Id. § 92.052.
247. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 490 S.W.3d at 474.
248. Id. at 474 (citing Churchill Forge, Inc. v. Brown, 61 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Tex. 2001)
(discussing Section 92.006, “[l]egislative permission to contract under certain circumstances
does not necessarily imply that contracting under other circumstances is prohibited”)).
249. Id. at 471.
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the tenant negligently caused the fire but nonetheless found the tenant
liable for the damage pursuant to the lease agreement.250 The trial court
entered a take-nothing judgment notwithstanding the verdict but did not
specify the exact grounds.251 The court of appeals affirmed on the basis
that the lease agreement shifted responsibility for repairs to the tenant in
violation of the requirements of the Texas Property Code and was there-
fore void and unenforceable.252 Overturning the trial court and the court
of appeals, the supreme court relied on its analysis in Churchill Forge,
where it held that “(1) Section 92.006(c) does not restrict freedom of con-
tract unless the landlord has a duty to repair, and (2) under Section
92.052(b) a landlord has no duty to repair conditions ‘caused by’ the ten-
ant.”253 The supreme court went on to address the types of provisions
that are generally void because of public policy.254 The supreme court
distinguished between “a contract provision unenforceable as written and
one that is capable of being enforced as written.”255 Citing Lewis v. Da-
vis, the supreme court went on to state that “a contract will not be de-
clared void merely because it could have been performed illegally or
contrary to public policy.”256 Importantly the supreme court emphasizes
repeatedly that given the “State’s strong commitment to the principle of
contractual freedom, [the courts] should hesitate to infer a general prohi-
bition from a statutory clause granting specific permission to contract”257
and that “all rights not inconsistent with the statute remain intact.”258
With respect to the damages provision at issue in the Philadelphia case,
the supreme court went on to state that “[t]he provision would be unen-
forceable per se only if it could not be performed without violating the
Property Code.”259
The supreme court also addressed whether the tenant or the landlord
had the duty of proving the party responsible for the damages. The Phila-
delphia supreme court focused its analysis on Section 92.053 of the Texas
Property Code, which provides in part:
(a) Except as provided by this section, the tenant has the burden of
proof in a judicial action to enforce a right resulting from the
landlord’s failure to repair or remedy a condition under Section
92.052.
(b) If the landlord does not provide a written explanation for delay
in performing a duty to repair or remedy on or before the fifth
day after receiving from the tenant a written demand for an ex-
planation, the landlord has the burden of proving that he made a
250. Id.
251. Id. at 473.
252. Id. at 471.
253. Id. at 474 (citing Churchill Forge, Inc., 61 S.W.3d at 371–72).
254. Id. at 483.
255. Id. at 483 n.8 (citing Lewis v. Davis, 199 S.W.2d 146, 148–49 (Tex. 1947)).
256. Id. (citing Lewis, 199 S.W.2d at 149).
257. Id. at 481 (quoting Churchill Forge, Inc., 61 S.W.3d at 371).
258. Id. at 479 (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.061 (West 2014)).
259. Id. at 483.
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diligent effort to repair and that a reasonable time for repair did
not elapse.260
The Philadelphia supreme court went on to conclude that “[t]aken to-
gether, sections 92.052 and 92.053 create a presumption that damage to
premises under the tenant’s control was caused by the tenant and the
tenant must prove otherwise.”261
Four Justices filed dissenting opinions strongly disagreeing with the ma-
jority opinion on the issue of burden of proof.262 In their dissent, the Jus-
tices also relied on Churchill and argued that, as they stated in Churchill
and pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the burden was on the
landlord to prove that the tenant caused the fire and not on the tenant to
prove she did not cause the fire.263 The dissent believed the burden was
on the landlord and not the tenant because the fact that the tenant caused
the fire is an affirmative defense to the landlord’s unwaivable duty to
repair, and the burden is therefore on the landlord to establish the benefit
of the exception.264 The dissent went on to cite a number of cases where
the Texas Supreme Court held that “‘the burden of proving a statutory
exception rests on the party seeking benefit from the exception,’ not on
the party seeking to avoid that benefit.”265 The dissent agreed that at
common law, absent the statutory provision in question, the tenant would
be obligated to pay for the damages.266 Although the majority acknowl-
edged that the statutory interpretation given in Churchill was different,
they dismissed it as dicta with no bearing on the conclusion reached in the
case.267
The dissent also addressed the issue of proof, arguing that the majority
was essentially asking the tenant to “prov[e] a negative,” which is a posi-
tion that the court has consistently recognized in the past as “difficult and
frequently impossible.”268
B. STATUTE OF FRAUDS; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
In Dupree v. Boniuk Interests, Ltd., the tenant, Dupree, signed a prom-
issory note with her landlord, Boniuk, whereby the tenant promised to
repay $21,499.00 “in sixty (60) equal monthly installments of FOUR
260. Id. at 486–87 (quoting PROP. § 92.053).
261. Id. at 487.
262. Id. at 491–97.
263. Id. at 494.
264. Id. at 493–95 (citing Churchill Forge, Inc. v. Brown, 61 S.W.3d 368, 372 (Tex. 2001)
(“Without showing that the damage was caused by the tenant, the landlord would other-
wise have a duty to bear the cost of repair . . . .”)).
265. Id. at 494 (citing Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Dall., Inc. v BH DFW, Inc., 402
S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex .App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (quoting City of Houston v. Jones,
679 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ))).
266. Id. at 492.
267. Id. at 487 n.10.
268. Id. at 495 (citing 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Tex. 2008) (quoting
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Matlock, 462 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1970))).
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HUNDRED FORTY AND 00/100 DOLLARS ($440.00).”269 The prom-
issory note did not state how or when the tenant received the principal
amount.270 The tenant contended that the principal amount was intended
as a personal loan and the landlord contended that the principal amount
was a credit against the tenant’s unpaid lease payments.271 The trial court
permitted the testimony of the landlord that at the time the promissory
note was executed the tenant had an unpaid balance of over $41,000 and
that the $21,499 was “placed against [the tenant’s] account; so [it was]
effectively paid to her.”272 The tenant partially appealed the trial court’s
ruling against her on the basis that the trial court should not have allowed
parol evidence to construe the note because the note was unambiguous
on its face.273 In Dupree, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that
the parol evidence rule did not bar the use of parol evidence to “show
collateral, contemporaneous agreements that are consistent with the un-
derlying agreement to be construed, but this exception to the parol evi-
dence rule ‘does not permit parol evidence that varies or contradicts
either the express terms or the implied terms of the written
agreement.’”274
In Wood v. Kennedy,275 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
again examined the applicability of the Statute of Frauds to an oral agree-
ment to lease space. George Wood claimed that in September 2012, he
and Doyle Murphee, Sr. entered into an oral agreement to allow Wood to
store materials relating to his business in a building owned by Murphee
for $250 per month. Wood also claimed that Murphee had agreed to give
Wood the option to purchase the property within one year. At some point
after Wood moved items into the building, Wood claimed he received
multiple calls from a person (the name of which he could not recall) stat-
ing that the rent was not $250 but $1,500 per month. In October 2012,
Murphee’s daughter became the guardian of Murphee’s estate.
Murphee’s daughter contacted Wood in September 2012 and told Wood
that she had “power of attorney from her father, and that the building
was not for sale, ‘so the deal was off.’”276 Wood then spoke to Murphee
and Murphee confirmed what the daughter had said. During the same
conversation, the daughter told Wood to remove his property from the
rented building. Wood never removed his property and never paid rent.
In November 2012, Murphee died. In a somewhat complicated series of
events not relevant to this discussion, the case ultimately ended up under
269. Dupree v. Boniuk Interests, Ltd., 472 S.W.3d 355, 366–67 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
270. Id. at 367.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 366.
274. Id. (quoting DeClaire v. G & B Mcintosh Family Ltd. P’ship, 260 S.W.3d 34, 35
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (citing Dameris v. Homestead Bank, 495
S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ))).
275. 473 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
276. Id.
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the jurisdiction of the probate court.277 In the probate court, Murphee’s
descendants sought eviction, possession, and ten months of unpaid rent
along with legal costs.278 The probate court issued a writ of possession,
awarded the decedents $6,250 for the unpaid rent, $297 in court fees, and
$9,189.20 in legal expenses.279 Wood appealed, challenging the evidence
to support the damages awarded and the award of legal fees.280
In order to determine the proper damages in an action for unpaid rent,
one must first determine the “nature of an individual’s tenancy”—are
they a “tenant at will” or a “tenant at sufferance?”281 Citing the Texas
Supreme Court holding in Coinmach, the Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals stated “[i]f the holdover tenant continues to pay rent, and the
landlord knows of the tenant’s possession and continues to accept rent
without objection, the tenant is a tenant at will and the terms of the prior
lease will continue to govern the new arrangement absent an agreement
to the contrary.”282 With a tenant at sufferance, there is no new agree-
ment, and “the proper measure of damages is the reasonable rental value
during the holdover period.”283 Because Wood never paid rent and had
been asked to vacate the premises, the court of appeals determined that
Wood was a tenant at sufferance but that there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s conclusion that the reasonably-calculated
rental value of the building was $6,250.284 As a tenant at sufferance, the
terms of Wood’s lease were no longer applicable to determine the unpaid
rental value; however, they could be evidence of the fair market value of
the property.285 The court of appeals found that “there was evidence that
Murphee Sr. had accepted Wood’s offer to lease the property for $250 per
month[,]” which demonstrates the fair market value of the property.286
C. LEASE INTERPRETATION
In Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. GTE Southwest Inc.,287 the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals examined the purported existence of a per-
petual lease for the use of telephone poles, the obligations of parties to
remove attachments from the telephone poles at the end of the lease if
the lease was not perpetual, and whether a holdover tenant is guilty of
trespass. Tri-County involved two different agreements between Tri-
County Electric Cooperative (Tri-County) and predecessors of Verizon,




281. Id. at 335.
282. Id. (citing Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 916
(Tex. 2013)).
283. Id. (citing Alford v. Johnston, 224 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet.
denied).
284. Id. at 336.
285. Id. at 340.
286. Id.
287. 490 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).
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which governed the joint use of utility poles.288 One of the agreements
was originally negotiated in 1959 and the other in 1975, and both agree-
ments provided for periodic adjustments of the rental rates.289 In 2003,
Tri-County requested a rental rate adjustment pursuant to the methodol-
ogy outlined in the agreements requiring the sharing of certain operating
cost details.290 After Verizon failed to respond to the written request, Tri-
County notified Verizon in 2005 of its intent to terminate the agreements
effective February 2, 2008, along with a new rental rate (based on public
FCC filings) effective for the remaining three-year term.291 Tri-County
also notified Verizon that Verizon would be required to remove all at-
tachments from Tri-County’s poles.292 After sending the letter, Tri-
County realized that Verizon was also in breach of the agreements be-
cause it had failed to notify Tri-County that it had been placing new at-
tachments on the poles.293 Ultimately, Tri-County sued Verizon for (1)
breach of contract for failing to pay rentals after 2005; (2) breach of con-
tract, wrongful holdover, trespass, and trespass to try title for failing to
remove attachments after the termination; and (3) breach of contract for
failure to comply with the agreements’ requirements that Verizon obtain
approval for additional attachments.294 In response, Verizon argued that
(1) the agreements required increases in the rental rate to be mutually
agreed upon; (2) the agreements did not contain a removal provision, so
Verizon had the right to remain on Tri-County’s poles in perpetuity; and
(3) the inventory Tri-County had performed of the Verizon attachments
was faulty.295 Verizon and Tri-County each filed motions for summary
judgment and the trial court verbally granted Verizon’s motion.296
The court of appeals disagreed with the majority of the trial court’s
ruling.297 The first issue the court of appeals addressed was whether Ver-
izon was required to remove their attachments after termination or if the
agreements allowed the attachments to remain in perpetuity.298 Although
the agreements did not specifically address the removal of attachments
after termination, they did address removal of attachments in the event a
nonowner of a pole decided it no longer desired to use a pole that has
attachments of the nonowner.299 The provision effectively provided that
“the parties intended that nonowner attachments would be allowed to
remain only on owner-designated joint use poles for which rental is paid
288. Id. at 534–35.
289. Id.




294. Id. at 535–36. Tri-County actually amended their petition twice. This is a broad
summary of the ultimate issues.
295. Id. at 538.
296. Id. at 536.
297. Id. at 534.
298. Id. at 544.
299. Id.
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unless the nonowner desired to purchase the pole.”300 Furthermore, an-
other provision clearly provided that the use of the poles was subject to
the “duration and scope of [senior landowner] easements.”301 The court
of appeals concluded that both provisions clearly “weigh[ed] against a
conclusion that the parties intended a perpetual lease of the joint use
poles” and, therefore, the attachments were required to be removed after
the termination of the agreements.302
The court of appeals then addressed the trespass-based claims.303 Ver-
izon contended that because Tri-County demanded rent for the period of
time after the termination of the agreement, Tri-County had elected to
treat Verizon as a tenant and not a trespasser.304 The court of appeals
relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Coinmach to differentiate
between a tenant at will, which remains in possession of premises with the
landlord’s consent and therefore cannot, by definition, be guilty of tres-
pass, and a tenant at sufferance who retains possession without consent
and is, by definition, guilty of trespass.305 Because the court of appeals
felt that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether
Tri-County “elected to treat [Verizon] as a tenant at will rather than a
tenant at sufferance,” the court of appeals remanded the case for deter-
mination of that fact.306
D. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR DISABILITIES
In an important case for landlords, Chavez v. Aber, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division, addressed the
issue of housing discrimination on the basis of the defendants’ refusal to
accommodate the plaintiff’s minor son’s mental health disability.307 The
plaintiff in the case, Yvonne Chavez, sought damages she claimed re-
sulted from the defendants’ refusal to permit her son’s service dog.308 The
plaintiff had rented a duplex apartment from the defendants since
2006.309 In January 2010, the plaintiff signed a new lease with defendants
that contained a “no pets” policy.310 In 2011, the son’s doctor recom-
mended the son utilize an emotional support animal and the plaintiff
adopted a three-month old pit bull mix.311 Although the plaintiff’s lease
contained a no pets policy, multiple other tenants in the building owned
dogs.312 The defendants, however, did not want a pit bull on their prop-
300. Id. at 545




305. Id. at 547 (citing Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d
909, 917 (Tex. 2013)).
306. Id. at 551.
307. Chavez v. Aber, 122 F. Supp. 3d 581, 586 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at. 587.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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erty and requested that the plaintiff get rid of the dog.313 The plaintiff
explained the situation to the defendants and asked the defendants to
make an accommodation to their no pets policy.314 The defendants ini-
tially refused the request for accommodation but eventually built a
fenced area to separate the plaintiff’s yard from her neighbors.315 None-
theless, during a period of over a year, which spanned the time the fence
was built, the defendants sent the plaintiff multiple notices to vacate, de-
manded an additional deposit for the support animal, attempted to raise
the plaintiff’s rent by $200, refused to conduct repairs, called animal con-
trol on multiple occasions, and filed multiple suits to evict the plaintiff.316
The plaintiff ultimately moved into a new apartment that cost $220 more
per month and filed against the defendants for “(1) housing discrimina-
tion under the FHA, (2) unlawful retaliation under the FHA, (3) discrim-
ination under the Texas Fair Housing Act (“THFA”), and (4) unlawful
retaliation under [Section] 92.331 of the Texas Property Code.”317 The
defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff’s claims
were moot because the defendants built the fence separating the yards,
and the plaintiff lacked standing to bring individual claims.318 The district
court ruled that the building of the fence did not moot the plaintiff’s
claims because the plaintiff never requested the building of the fence.319
Furthermore, the district court ruled that the plaintiff had (1) individual
standing under the FHA;320 (2) pled plausible claims against the apart-
ment manager and the complex;321 (3) sufficiently pled that the defend-
ants had knowledge of the disability;322 (4) sufficiently pled that the
accommodation requested by the plaintiff was reasonable;323 (5) suffi-
ciently pled that the defendants refused to make the requested accommo-
dation;324 (6) sufficiently pled a case for retaliation under the FHA and
the Texas Property Code;325 and (7) sufficiently pled a case for discrimi-
nation under Section 301.025, Subsections (a), (b), and (c)(2) of the Texas
Property Code.326 As a result of the district court’s findings, the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss was denied.327 Although there is no record of a
final decision in this case, the discussion of the facts of the case and the
district court’s analysis present an important warning to landlords regard-
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 587, 589.
316. Id. at 587–90.
317. Id. at 589–90.
318. Id. at 591–92.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 592.
321. Id. at 593–601.
322. Id. at 595–96.
323. Id. at 596–97.
324. Id. at 597–99.
325. Id. at 599–601.
326. Id. at 601.
327. Id. at 602.
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ing the need to reasonably accommodate disabilities, including the use of
related support animals.
E. HOLDOVER RENT; DAMAGES
Pointe West Center, LLC v. It’s Alive, Inc.328 provides several impor-
tant tips for landlords. In Pointe West Center, the landlord, Pointe West
Center, sued the tenant, It’s Alive, Inc., for holdover rent and approxi-
mately $57,373 in damages to the premises discovered after the tenant
vacated.329 The lease in question was a five-year lease that expired on
August 15, 2012.330 Prior to expiration of the lease, in May of 2012, the
tenant sent the landlord a letter requesting the ability to remain on the
premises after expiration of the lease on a month-to-month basis at the
current rent, but the landlord did not respond to the letter.331 After the
expiration of the lease, the tenant paid the landlord its current rent for
August and September.332 After deciding to move out, the tenant dam-
aged the space.333 The landlord prepared the space for the next occupant
and repaired the damage simultaneously.334 At trial, the jury only
awarded $15,000 in repair costs and nothing for the holdover penalty.335
The landlord appealed.336 During the course of the trial, the landlord had
easily established the injury to the Premises by admitting photographs
into evidence documenting the injury.337 Unfortunately, the landlord
failed to document that the repair costs were reasonable or what the ac-
tual costs were.338 The landlord was unable to isolate the repair expenses
from the normal wear and tear expenses incurred in turning a rental
space or from repairs conducted on other premises.339 The First Houston
Court of Appeals found that “[b]ecause there was no proof of the actual
amount of damages, there was no proof that the damages presented were
reasonable or necessary.”340 Because the actual amount of damages was
indeterminable from the evidence introduced at trial, the court of appeals
remanded for a new trial on the issues of liability and damages.341 The
lesson for landlords is to carefully document all expenses related to re-
pairing tenant damage, including the hours spent to fix each item and the
cost of items purchased for the repairs. Landlords also need to be able to
328. 476 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet denied).
329. Id. at 145–46.
330. Id. at 145.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 145–46.
334. Id. at 146
335. Id. at 147.
336. Id. at 145.
337. Id. at 148–49 (citing McGinty v. Hennen, 372 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex.
2004) (per curiam))).
338. Id. at 149.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 149 (citing McGinty, 372 S.W. 3d at 627).
341. Id. at 150.
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distinguish between repairs for regular wear and tear and repairs related
to tenant damage.
In Pointe West Center, the court of appeals also addressed the Statute
of Frauds and a provision found in virtually all agreements.342 At trial,
the jury failed to award the Landlord the holdover penalty and the land-
lord appealed.343 The tenant claimed that the landlord and tenant had
orally modified the lease.344 The landlord claimed that there could be no
oral modification because the lease, like most contracts, required all
amendments to be in writing.345 The court of appeals pointed out that
“[a] written contract not required by law to be in writing, may be modi-
fied by a subsequent oral agreement even though it provides it can be
modified only by a written agreement.”346 Although the court of appeals
agreed that the Statute of Frauds applies to a lease of real estate for a
period greater than one year (which, in the present case, would have ordi-
narily required that any amendment to the lease be in writing) the court
of appeals held that the same is not true for a lease that is on a month-to-
month basis for an indefinite period of time.347 As a result, it was possible
for the jury to have found that the landlord was not entitled to a holdover
penalty because the lease was month to month, which meant that it could
be orally modified and, therefore, the appeals court affirmed the jury’s
failure to award the holdover penalty.348
VII. CONSTRUCTION MATTERS
A. CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE
In Frazier v. GRNC Realty, LLC,349 the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals once again addressed the certificate of merit issue. In Frazier, the
project owner filed suit against the construction company and many of
the subcontractors, including the architect, for negligence and other mis-
cellaneous claims related to the design of the heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning system.350 In Frazier, there was no dispute that the plaintiff,
GRNC Realty, failed to file the required certificate of merit with its origi-
nal suit.351 However, the defendant, Frazier, who was proceeding pro se,
342. Id. at 150–52.
343. Id. at 147.
344. Id. at 151.
345. Id.
346. Id. (quoting Robins v. Warren, 782 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1989, no writ) (citing Mar-Lan Indus., Inc. v. Nelson, 635 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1982, no writ))); accord Roehrs v. FSI Holdings, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 796, 808
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied); Double Diamond, Inc. v. Hilco Elec. Coop., Inc.,
127 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, no pet.).
347. Id. at 151 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 26.01(a)(1), (b)(5) (West 2015);
Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 915–16 (Tex. 2013);
Robb v. San Antonio St. Ry., 82 Tex. 392 (1891)); cf. Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517
S.W.2d 773, 775–76 (Tex. 1974).
348. Id. at 151–52.
349. 476 S.W.3d 70, 71 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, pet. denied).
350. Id. at 72.
351. Id.
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filed an answer to the suit in May of 2011, whereby not only did he fail to
“assert a general denial to deny the five allegations of design negligence
against him,”352 he also admitted liability.353 Furthermore, at a later point
during the suit, Frazier provided discovery in which he admitted liabil-
ity.354 Frazier also outlined in his original answer the actions he took to
remedy the situation.355 In August 2012, Frazier finally filed a motion to
dismiss under Section 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, related to the failure to file a certificate of merit, which was denied
by the trial court.356 The Frazier court of appeals, citing the Texas Su-
preme Court’s holding in Crosstex Energy Services, LP v. Pro Plus,
Inc.,357 stated that “Section 150.002 imposes a mandatory, non-jurisdic-
tional filing requirement, and a defendant may waive its right to seek
dismissal under the statute.”358
The Frazier court of appeals went on to cite a 1981 case, Alford, Mer-
oney & Co. v. Rowe,359 which established the elements of waiver.360 The
elements of waiver discussed by the Frazier court of appeals are:
(1) express renunciation of a known right; (2) silence or inaction,
coupled with knowledge of the known right, for such an unreasona-
ble period of time as to indicate an intention to waive the right; or
(3) other conduct of the party knowingly possessing the right of such
a nature as to mislead the opposite party into an honest belief that
the waiver was intended or assented to.361
The court of appeals then went on to address the issue of waiver, spe-
cifically with respect to cases involving Chapter 150.362 The court of ap-
peals stated that whether a party has waived its right to dismiss under
Section 150.001 is usually a question of intent.363 The court of appeals
then cited what appeared on their face to be two contradictory holdings
to support its conclusion that “Frazier’s actions prior to seeking dismissal
amount to a waiver of his right to seek dismissal under section
352. Id. at 72, 74.
353. Id. at 74 (“[T]he design of the HVAC system was, in fact, faulty in design created a
negative pressure in the building [sic].”).
354. Id. at 75. (“[I]n his responses to Requests for Admission, he answered as follows:
Request for Admission No. 5: Admit that as the architect who designed the plans for
Ganado Nursing Facility, it was part of your duties to ensure that the facility was con-
structed pursuant to the requirements and regulations contained in Title 40 of the Texas
Administrative Code, Chapter 19, Nursing Facility Requirements for Licensure and Medi-
caid Certification. [Frazier’s Response]: Admit.”).
355. Id. at 74.
356. Id. at 72–73.
357. 430 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. 2014).
358. Frazier, 476 S.W.3d at 73–74.
359. 619 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
360. Frazier, 476 S.W.3d at 74.
361. Id. (citing Alford, 619 S.W.2d at 213).
362. Id.
363. Id.
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150.002.”364 The first case cited by the court of appeals was Crosstex.365 In
Crosstex, the facts appear to be analogous to the Frazier case because the
defendant filed an answer, participated in discovery, and availed itself of
other procedural matters. However, in Crosstex, the Texas Supreme
Court found that despite these facts, the “defendant did not waive its
right to a certificate of merit.”366 In the second case cited by the Frazier
court of appeals, Murphy v. Gutierrez,367 the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals found that “a party can substantially invoke the judicial process to
such an extent that it is clear the litigant is abandoning the right to dis-
miss the case under section 150.002.”368
The court balanced the seemingly contrary cases, and justified its own
conclusion by citing a 2013 Texas Supreme Court Case, CTL/Thompson
Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowners Association, Inc., where the su-
preme court emphasized that the intent behind Chapter 150 “is to deter
meritless claims and bring them quickly to an end.”369 Because the defen-
dant in this case had openly admitted that the case was not meritless, the
court of appeals felt that “granting a motion to dismiss in this case would
defeat the purpose of this statute.”370
In a well-argued dissent, Justice Perkins cites numerous cases where
defendants substantially invoked the judicial system and were much more
active than in Frazier yet were still able to rely on Section 150.002 to
obtain dismissal.371 Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that the Murphy
case relied upon by the majority was an outlier and the only appellate
court case that had examined the issue of waiver in the “context of sec-
tion 150.002 [and] . . . found waiver to exist.”372 Regardless of whether
you find the arguments of the majority or the dissent more persuasive,
the message to practitioners is clear—to be safe, Section 150.002 should
be invoked in all cases involving a negligence claim in construction at the
commencement of the suit and not after a defendant has substantially
availed himself of the judicial process.
The Dallas Court of Appeals also addressed the certificate of merit
statute in Jennings, Hackler & Partners, Inc. v. North Texas Municipal
Water District.373 In Jennings, the plaintiff, the North Texas Municipal
364. Id.
365. Id. (citing Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 394–95
(Tex. 2014)).
366. Id. (citing Crosstex Energy Servs., 430 S.W.3d at 394–95; Jernigan v. Langley, 111
S.W.3d 153, 156–57 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Tenneco, Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925
S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996)).
367. Id. (citing Murphy v. Gutierrez, 374 S.W.3d 627, 633–35 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2012, pet. denied)).
368. Murphy, 374 S.W.3d at 631.
369. Frazier, 476 S.W.3d at 75 (quoting CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Home-
owner’s Ass’n, 390 S.W.3d 299, 301 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam)).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 76 (Perkes, J., dissenting) (citing Crosstex, 430 S.W.3d at 394–95; Ustanik v.
Nortex Found. Designs, Inc., 320 S.W.3d 409, 414 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. denied)).
372. Id. (citing Murphy, 374 S.W. 3d at 630).
373. 471 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).
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Water District, hired the defendant (Jennings), an architecture firm, to
“provide architectural, civil engineering, MEP engineering, structural en-
gineering and geotechnical engineering services.”374 The defendant then
subcontracted the mechanical engineering services to TurkWorks.375 Af-
ter the building was finished, the defendant had significant problems with
the HVAC system and, after those problems were not corrected by the
defendant, the plaintiff ultimately filed suit against the defendant alleging
direct and vicarious negligence.376 The plaintiff attached an affidavit to its
original petition stating that “TurkWorks failed to exercise reasonable
care.”377 The affidavit was signed by Gregory G. Schober, M.S., P.E. Be-
cause the affidavit was not provided by an architect, Jennings moved to
dismiss using Section 150.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.378 The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the
defendant appealed.379 The court of appeals partially reversed the trial
court’s ruling and found that although a certificate of merit signed by an
architect was required for the plaintiff to proceed against the defendant
on direct negligence claims, it was not required for the vicarious liability
claims because a vicarious liability claim does not require “any wrongful
conduct by the professional.”380
In Couchman v. Cardona,381 the First Houston Court of Appeals also
addressed the certificate of merit issue. The plaintiff, Cardona, filed suit
against the defendants, Toby Paul Couchman and Pro-Surv, claiming that
they failed to correctly indicate that property she purchased was in a
flood plain.382 Unfortunately, the plaintiff failed to file a certificate of
merit with the suit, and, after the defendants moved to dismiss, the plain-
tiff nonsuited the claim and the suit was dismissed without prejudice.383
The plaintiff then refiled the suit, including the certificate of merit.384 The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including the
ground that the second suit was barred because the plaintiff “was re-
quired to file a certificate of merit with her ‘first-filed’ petition.”385 The
trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants
appealed.386 The defendants’ case relied upon language in two cases de-
cided by the First Houston Court of Appeals, Pelco Construction., Inc. v.






380. Id. at 584 (citing United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Brite, 215 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex.
2007); Dall. Merch.’s & Concessionaire’s Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 493 n.7
(Tex. 1993)).
381. 471 S.W.3d 20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
382. Id. at 22.
383. Id. at 22–23.
384. Id. at 23.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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Dannenbaum Engineering Corp.387 and Pakal Enterprises, Inc. v. Lesak
Enterprises LLC.388 Although the court of appeals in those cases used the
“first-filed” language when describing the requirements of Section
150.002(a), neither case actually involved the filing of an earlier case that
was dismissed.389 The language relied upon by the defendants, therefore,
was dicta and did not appear in the statute.390 The court of appeals sus-
tained the trial court’s refusal to grant the motion to dismiss for failure to
file a certificate of merit in the “first-filed” petition.391
VIII. TITLE MATTERS
A. ADVERSE POSSESSSION/TITLE DISPUTES
There were only a few cases addressing adverse possession during this
Survey period and a few other cases discussing specific aspects of title
disputes. These are discussed below.
First, with respect to adverse possession, the case of NAC Tex Hotel
Co. v. Greak392 highlights the need to give notice to vacate in an adverse
possession case if there is a desire to recover attorney’s fees. There are
specific aspects of Section 16.034 of the Texas Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code that must be followed in order to recover attorney’s fees, in-
cluding a ten-day period after sending notice by certified mail before
filing the claim for recovery of possession.393 Also of interest in this case,
the claimant “testified that she would ‘never intentionally take any-
thing.’”394 This raised the question as to intent and hostility and resulted
in a jury question.395 Also, a very factual investigation and good discus-
sion of adverse possession can be found in Estrada v. Cheshire.396 Other-
wise, this case really raises nothing new with respect to the ten-year and
twenty-five year adverse possession statutes.
Similarly, Williams v. Mai397 has a good discussion regarding the
processes for partition, but does not raise anything new. The Fourteenth
Houston District Court of Appeals in Goodman-Delaney v. Grantham398
also noted and somewhat clarified a confusing concept regarding the
“possession” of property. In this case, in the absence of a landlord-tenant
387. 404 S.W.3d 48, 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
388. 369 S.W.3d 224, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
389. Couchman, 471 S.W.3d at 24. “When required, the certificate of merit must be
filed with the first-filed petition asserting the relevant claim against a professional.” Id.
(quoting Pelco, 404 S.W.3d at 53). “[S]ection 150.002 requires a plaintiff to file a certificate
of merit with the first-filed petition asserting a negligence claim against a professional.” Id.
(quoting Pakal, 369 S.W.3d at 228).
390. Id. at 24–25.
391. Id. at 27.
392. 481 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.).
393. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.034 (West 2012).
394. Greak, 481 S.W.3d at 331.
395. Id. at 332–33.
396. 470 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
397. 471 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
398. 484 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
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relationship, the justice court lacked jurisdiction to address the right to
possession between an owner and an occupier.399
Two title dispute cases raised interesting new questions. In West 17th
Resources, LLC v. Pawelek, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found
that a deed purporting to convey the entirety of the property, but which
was only signed in an individual capacity, also included the interest held
by a trust for which the individual was the trustee.400 There was no speci-
fication of the trust as a grantor nor did the individual sign the deed as
trustee, but rather only as an individual. The court of appeals looked at
the overall intent of the deed to convey the entirety of the property,
which could only be accomplished if the trust was part of the convey-
ance.401 Accordingly, the deed was construed “to confer upon the grantee
the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument w[ould] permit.”402
The court of appeals felt that not including the interest of the trust would
be an implied reservation, which was disfavored in view of the intent of
the deed to convey the entirety of the property.403 This decision is troub-
lesome in that while there might have been a breach of warranty, the
separateness of the trust was not observed. The trust was not named as a
grantor and essentially was written into the deed by the conduct of the
court of appeals.
B. DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES
The courts addressed a number of miscellaneous issues in the area of
deeds and conveyances during the Survey period. In Mueller v. Davis, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals found the use of a catch-all phrase, “all of
those certain tracts or parcels of land out of the following surveys in Har-
rison County, Texas, described as,” insufficient to adequately identify the
contested property.404 The deed then listed parcels by production units
and acreage. No metes and bounds descriptions were included, and the
legal descriptions were insufficient.405 But, the deed also included a
“Mother Hubbard Clause” for the entire county in the same paragraph as
the stripes and gores language. An argument was made that the grant of
all property in Harrison County saved the inadequate legal description.406
399. Id. at 175.
400. W. 17th Res., LLC v. Pawelek, 482 S.W.3d 690, 696 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2015, pet. denied).
401. Id. at 695.
402. Id. (quoting Large v. T. Mayfield, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Eastland
1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
403. Id.
404. Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016), rev’d, No. 16-
0155, 2017 WL 2299316, at *1 (Tex. 2017). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals in this decision after the Survey period, finding that the language in
the deed unambiguously conveyed the property.
405. Id. at 625, 628.
406. Id. at 629; see also Huggins v. Royalty Clearinghouse, Ltd., 121 F. Supp. 3d 646,
655, 657 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (where a grant of all of the grantor’s property in a survey in
Burleson County was sufficient, and the court found that the error was discoverable at the
point of the conveyance such that a four year limitations period to reform applied.).
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The court of appeals found this created an ambiguity as to intent, thereby
creating a jury question.407
A good drafting discussion for mineral conveyances can be found in
Kardell v. Acker.408 Unlike the Mueller case, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals looked to all the language in the deed, and created harmony
between and gave effect to all parts of the deed in order to give every
provision meaning.409 The words and the phrases of the deed were “con-
strued together and in context” to determine intent.410 The court of ap-
peals did not find a fact question requiring jury determination.411 The
court of appeals spent some time discussing Garza v. Prolithic Energy
Co.412 and Altman v. Blake413 with respect to the “five essential attributes
of a severed mineral estate.”414 While there was a mineral lease in place
granting a one-eighth royalty, the grant of one-fifth of the mineral estate
was just that—and not one-fifth of one-eighth.415
In another case out of San Antonio, Lemus v. Aguilar,416 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the effect of a handwritten will,
which was alleged by certain heirs to act as a gift deed after the will did
not qualify as a valid last will and testament. The outcome should have
been obvious, but the court of appeals reaffirmed that a will is not a
deed.417 The court of appeals took it a step further to reemphasize that
the decedent lacked capacity and the execution of a deed by a grantor
without mental capacity would be void.418 This analysis could become im-
portant in the face of pending legislation that mandates acceptance of a
power of attorney generally created for estate planning purposes. The ba-
sis and the requirements for rejecting a power of attorney are limited and
the lack of capacity of the principal could be a difficult determination,
especially after the passage of time from the original execution of the
power of attorney. Parts of the proposed legislation in the current legisla-
tive session provide that a bona fide acceptance of the power of attorney
makes it binding, which in effect could validate what would have been a
defective deed or void deed if executed by the grantor.419 This issue of
course would most likely arise in the context of a durable power of
attorney.
In York v. Boatman,420 the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed an
407. Mueller, 485 S.W.3d at 630–31.
408. 492 S.W.3d 837 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
409. Id. at 842.
410. Id. (quoting Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2016)).
411. Id.
412. 195 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
413. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986).
414. Kardell, 492 S.W.3d at 843.
415. Id. at 844.
416. 491 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
417. Id. at 58.
418. Id. at 60.
419. Act of May 26, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., H.B. 1974 (to be codified as an amendment
to TEX. EST. CODE ch. 751).
420. 487 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.).
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issue that is relevant to Transfer of Death Deeds and Lady Bird Deeds
now more commonly being utilized. The parties were debating the effi-
cacy of a deed that granted a future interest in a piece of property. This
analysis is of interest because it found that even though the estate might
commence in the future, the interest was present because it was defined
and was immediately effective.421 This is to be distinguished from a deed
of an interest that might arise in the future. Alternatively, a transfer on
death may now be accomplished by statute, and does not grant any inter-
est until the death of the grantor, and then only if the interest is still in
place or the transfer-on-death deed was not revoked in some other man-
ner. A Lady Bird Deed grants a present interest such as a life estate with
the remainder vested upon death. In the context of the Lady Bird Deed,
the holder of the life estate retains the right to revoke or otherwise trans-
fer the entirety of the estate before death.
C. EASEMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court followed, but clarified, its earlier decision in
Hamrick v. Ward422 in the 2016 case of Staley Family Partnership, Ltd. v.
Stiles.423 In the Staley Family litigation, the issue involved a land-locked
tract and a roadway easement across adjacent property to a public road-
way. The Staley tract at all times was bounded on the east and the south
by an unnamed tributary of Honey Creek. The creek separated the Staley
tract from the Frances Helm property subject to an earlier conveyance.
The case includes a good illustrative drawing.424 The public road in ques-
tion was along the northern boundary of an original tract, which property
was originally a singular tract. In 1866, a probate court partitioned the
tract among other land into three portions to Axia Ann Helms, James
Helms, and Frances Helms. Frances Helms conveyed her property to
James in 1870, but not including the Staley tract portion between the
creeks. Subsequently, all of the Axia and James Helms tracts, not includ-
ing the portion acquired from Frances Helms, were conveyed to the
Stiles. In 2009, the Staley Family Partnership acquired the 10.129 acres to
the west of the tract conveyed by Frances Helms and lying between the
two creeks. The Staley Family Partnership sought an easement across the
Stileses’ property to the County Road 134 to the north but the evidence
determined that the County Road 134 did not exist at the time of the
severance of the properties.425 Accordingly, while an easement by neces-
sity is created when there is a unity of ownership and there is a necessity
for an easement to access a public road, it does not apply if there was no
public road at the time of the severance.426 Essentially, the Staley Family
Partnership bought property that was land-locked at the time and not
421. Id. at 640–41.
422. 446 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2014).
423. 483 S.W.3d 545, 549–50 (Tex. 2016).
424. Id. at 546.
425. Id. at 547, 549–50.
426. Id. at 548–50.
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part of a severance purchase. One can wonder what other historical evi-
dence was not included in the litigation, as it is probable that there was
some access for the Frances Helms tract when originally severed.
Also of interest, in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Seber, the Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals declined to permit Seber to assert an implied
easement by prior use.427 The court of appeals noted the Texas Supreme
Court decision of Hamrick v. Ward and the clarification of the law on
implied easements, but the court of appeals remanded the case for a de-
termination as to whether or not the railroad crossing, a roadway, was an
easement by necessity.428
D. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS,
AND OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
The only case during the Survey period believed to be worthy of note is
Trant v. Brazos Valley Solid Waste Management Agency, Inc.,429 in which
an option contract provided the cities of Bryan and College Station the
right to purchase certain property from the Trants. The option contract
stated that the cities contemplated using the property as a landfill. The
cities did indeed use a portion of the property as a landfill, but also deter-
mined to use a portion of the property as a firing range. The Trants con-
tended that the property could only be used as a landfill as the terms and
conditions and representations in the option contract were incorporated
into the warranty deed by which the property was acquired. The Texas
Supreme Court observed that when interpreting restrictive covenants,
those restricting the free use of land were not favored.430 In this case the
supreme court found that a statement of intent in the option agreement
did not rise to the level of a restricted covenant.431 This is a drafting les-
son worthy of note.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS
A. NUISANCE/TRESPASS
The Supreme Court of Texas addressed the difficult issue (5-4) of in-
verse condemnation in the context of a trespass case. In Harris County
Flood Control District v. Kerr,432 the county was alleged to have ap-
proved new developments without mitigating resulting runoff drainage
issues, which caused the plaintiffs’ homes to flood. The homeowners
claimed that the governmental entities knew this development would lead
to flooding, and that they approved the development without appropri-
ately addressing mitigation. The county argued that it could not have
427. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Seber, 477 S.W.3d 424, 433–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist] 2015, no pet.).
428. Id. at 434–35.
429. 478 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
430. Id. at 59 (citing J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003)).
431. Id. at 60.
432. 499 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2016).
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been consciously aware that the approval of the development would re-
sult in the flooding of the plaintiffs’ homes. The county claimed, and the
supreme court agreed, that it never intended to cause flooding, and many
years and resources were spent developing and partially implementing
flood-control plans to prevent future flooding issues.433 The supreme
court found that a “requisite intent [for an inverse condemnation] is pre-
sent when a governmental entity knows that a specific act is causing iden-
tifiable harm or knows that the harm is substantially certain to result.”434
The intent element is not about the act itself, but rather the knowledge
that the harm will occur, but negligence is not sufficient.435 The supreme
court held that the homeowners had failed to raise a fact question regard-
ing intent.436 The county won because the majority found that it is not
responsible for predicting floods and it never intended to cause them.437
Furthermore, the government is not liable under the takings clause for
natural disasters, such as storms that may cause flooding.438 Justice
Lehrmann filed a concurring opinion expressing concern regarding the
need to compensate for a taking for private use.439 Justices Devine,
Hecht, Green, and Boyd dissented.440 The dissenting justices found that
the homeowners had raised the fact question regarding intent that could
be submitted to the jury because the homeowners presented evidence
that the governmental entities knew this development would lead to
flooding, and that the development was approved without appropriately
mitigating it.441
B. PREMISES LIABILITY
The Texas Supreme Court also delivered an important opinion relating
to Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which lim-
its a property owner’s liability from injuries to a contractor.442 The deci-
sion in First Texas Bank v. Carpenter determined that “a contractor is
simply someone who works on an improvement to real property” and “an
actual contract . . . to perform a specific kind of work” for stated compen-
sation was not required.443 In this case a roofing contractor who routinely
assisted the owner of the real property was injured while working with an
insurance adjuster to demonstrate damage to the roof. He “argued that
Chapter 95 [was] inapplicable because he had no contract with the bank
433. Id. at 797–99.
434. Id. at 799 (quoting Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex.
2004)).
435. Id. at 799, 810 n.64.
436. Id. at 807.
437. See id. at 808.
438. See id.
439. Id. at 811–13 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
440. Id. at 813–20 (Devine, J., dissenting).
441. Id. at 816–17.
442. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 95.001–.004 (West 2011).
443. First Tex. Bank v. Carpenter, 491 S.W.3d 729, 730, 731 (Tex. 2016).
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and was therefore not its contractor.”444 The supreme court found that
applicability of Chapter 95 “turn[ed] on the kind of work being done, not
on whether an agreement for the work to be done was written, or formal,
or detailed.”445 “The statute cannot fairly be read to cover only contrac-
tors with formal written contracts, but still cover subcontractors and em-
ployees with no contracts at all.”446 One might argue that the carpenter
was only a consultant in particular circumstances, but the contrary argu-
ment was that the carpenter was assisting the insurance adjuster as part of
his overall scope of performing the roofing repairs. Because the record
was not clear that the bank had been paying the carpenter to perform
work covered by Chapter 95 during the time he was injured, the case was
remanded for determination on both issues.447
The Texas Supreme Court also addressed the recreational use statute in
Lawson v. City of Diboll,448 in which a spectator at a youth softball game
was injured via a trip-and-fall accident while exiting a baseball complex.
The issue before the supreme court was “whether the recreational use
statute encompasse[d] the spectator’s claims against the city.”449 The su-
preme court held that the act of watching a youth softball game in the city
park was not “‘recreation’ under the recreational use statute,” therefore
the city was not limited in the damages it owed to the injured party.450 By
way of example, in City of El Paso v. Collins, it was sufficient that the
parents of an injured child alleged that the city had subjective knowledge
of dangerous conditions at the pool on the day that a child suffered inju-
ries swimming at the pool.451 This case in particular dealt with whether
subjective intent was sufficient to establish gross negligence, but it also
demonstrated the difference between watching or spectating, and actual
use of the recreational facilities.452 The recreational use statute also con-
trolled the situation and a separate claim under the Texas Tort Claims
Act was not available.453
Slip and falls also found their way into two other cases dealing with the
application of various statutes. In one, Cage v. Methodist Hospital, a hos-
pital visitor’s claim that she slipped on a wet floor and fell while visiting a
hospital patient did not meet the definition of a healthcare liability claim
under the Texas Medical Liability Act.454 The implication of this was that
the claim would not require an expert medical or healthcare report
444. Id. at 731.
445. Id. at 732.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 733.
448. 472 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 669 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.001(3) (West 2011)).
451. City of El Paso v. Collins, 483 S.W.3d 742, 742, 752 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no
pet.).
452. See id.
453. Id. at 757, 759.
454. Cage v. Methodist Hosp., 470 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, no pet.).
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before filing. Also, in East Texas Medical Center Gilmer v. Porter,455 a
patron had a slip and fall while walking through the emergency room and
brought a negligence action against the hospital. The hospital argued that
the patient did not meet the statutory prerequisite of attaching an expert
report with her claim, as is required for HCLCs.456 The Tyler Court of
Appeals held that the patron’s claim against the hospital was not a cov-
ered HCLC since the patron was not yet a patient.457
C. ENTITIES
Several cases during the Survey period dealt with the forfeiture of cor-
porate privileges. In Willis v. BPMT, LLC,458 the corporation entered
into a lease agreement and, at the time, was in good standing. Subse-
quently, the corporation went into default and lost its corporate privi-
leges, including forfeiture of the corporation for failure to comply with
franchise tax requirements. The debt, even though the amount was not
known until later, was created at the time of execution of the lease and
the president and owner of the company did not become individually lia-
ble.459 The same held true in Hovel v. Batzri, in which an LLC breached a
construction contract and then forfeited its charter and privileges by fail-
ing to pay its franchise tax.460 The individual owner was not liable for the
LLC’s breach of contract.461 In TransPecos Banks v. Strobach,462 the El
Paso Court of Appeals pointed out that “[a] corporation does not cease
to exist merely because its charter has been forfeited, so long as there is a
statutory right to have the charter reinstated’ . . . its legal existence is not
fully extinguished until the corporation is formally dissolved.”463
One other case that may have a drafting lesson is Alta Mesa Holdings,
L.P. v. Ives, in which the First Houston Court of Appeals pointed out that
the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, Chapter 38, which provides
for attorney’s fees for breach of contract, does not apply to an LLC but
only a corporation because of the language of the statute.464 Prudent
counsel, should they desire to provide for attorney’s fees for breach of
contract, should provide for such a provision in any contractual
agreements.
455. 485 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.).
456. Id. at 129.
457. Id.
458. 471 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
459. Id. at 34–35.
460. Hovel v. Batzri, 490 S.W.3d 132, 133, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,
pet. filed).
461. Id. at 149.
462. 487 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
463. Id. at 736 (quoting Doucakis v. Speiser, Krause, Madole, P.C., No. 08-00-00296-
CV, 2002 WL 1397155, *1, *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (mem. op., not desig-
nated for publication)).
464. Alta Mesa Holdings, L.P. v. Ives, 488 S.W.3d 438, 452–55 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
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X. CONCLUSION
Guidance for the practitioner on the use of the Attorney Immunity
Doctrine, pursuant to Sheena, and the Bona Fide Error Defense, pursu-
ant to Alanis, should be carefully considered and applied by those in the
workout/foreclosure area. Also in that arena, mortgage servicers of home
mortgages should be aware of their classification as a debt collector under
the TFDCPA. With the holding in Stewart, practitioners involved in the
restructure of defaulted loans should give special attention to the acceler-
ation and reinstatement of a note and the language used in any forbear-
ance or similar agreement. Based on the Texas Supreme Court’s Wood
and Garofolo decisions, the contractual provisions of a home-equity lien
will govern the parties’ rights, rather than claims of constitutional forfeit-
ures, and a noncompliant home-equity lien is a void instrument until all
constitutional defects are cured. Furthermore, limitations will not run on
such a void home-equity lien.
As in years past, Texas cases also continued to present drafting lessons
for the real estate practitioner, particularly with respect to conditions pre-
cedent or other contractual provisions that the court “feels” may result in
seemingly harsh consequences. The overall message to practitioners from
the collective cases discussed above is very clear: if you intend for a some-
what draconian result, or harsh consequences, such as a forfeiture, you
must draft the agreement and the specific provision very carefully and
very clearly. Otherwise, if there is any other feasible interpretation to be
given to the provision, the courts will most likely construe the provision
in such a way as to avoid the harsh consequences you actually intended.
The conveyancing cases reported during the Survey period again
demonstrate the need to use precise language and specify any particular
points. Time must be taken to give good legal descriptions and reserva-
tions, exceptions, and restrictions must be clearly stated. Moreover, the
authority to convey and the necessary parties must always be a considera-
tion. In addressing an adverse possession dispute, a condemnation, or
even a partition, counsel must first understand the process and the neces-
sary evidence and information.
